[or-cvs] r17814: {tor} Do not cannibalize a circuit that has run out of RELAY_EARLY (in tor/trunk: . src/or)

[nickm at seul.org]

Author: nickm
Date: 2008-12-29 14:55:13 -0500 (Mon, 29 Dec 2008)
New Revision: 17814

Modified:
   tor/trunk/ChangeLog
   tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c
Log:
Do not cannibalize a circuit that has run out of RELAY_EARLY cells.  Partial bug 878 fix.

Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog	2008-12-29 17:38:11 UTC (rev 17813)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog	2008-12-29 19:55:13 UTC (rev 17814)
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
   o Minor bugfixes:
     - Make get_interface_address() function work properly again; stop
       guessing the wrong parts of our address as our address.
+    - Do not cannibalize a circuit if we're out of RELAY_EARLY cells to
+      send on that circuit.  Otherwise we might violate the proposal-110
+      limit.  Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.  Partial fix for Bug 878.  Diagnosis
+      thanks to Karsten.
 
   o Code simplifications and refactoring:
     - Change our header file guard macros to be less likely to conflict
@@ -635,11 +639,6 @@
       reason is NO_ROUTE (that is, our network is down).
 
   o Major features:
-    - Implement most of proposal 110: The first K cells to be sent
-      along a circuit are marked as special "early" cells; only K "early"
-      cells will be allowed. Once this code is universal, we can block
-      certain kinds of DOS attack by requiring that EXTEND commands must
-      be sent using an "early" cell.
 
   o Major bugfixes:
     - Try to attach connections immediately upon receiving a RENDEZVOUS2

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c	2008-12-29 17:38:11 UTC (rev 17813)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c	2008-12-29 19:55:13 UTC (rev 17814)
@@ -896,7 +896,8 @@
       origin_circuit_t *circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(_circ);
       if ((!need_uptime || circ->build_state->need_uptime) &&
           (!need_capacity || circ->build_state->need_capacity) &&
-          (internal == circ->build_state->is_internal)) {
+          (internal == circ->build_state->is_internal) &&
+          circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) {
         if (info) {
           /* need to make sure we don't duplicate hops */
           crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath;