[or-cvs] r12255: Tidy v2 hidden service descriptor format code: fix memory le (in tor/trunk: . src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Sun Oct 28 19:48:17 UTC 2007
Author: nickm
Date: 2007-10-28 15:48:16 -0400 (Sun, 28 Oct 2007)
New Revision: 12255
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
tor/trunk/src/or/rendcommon.c
tor/trunk/src/or/rendservice.c
tor/trunk/src/or/routerparse.c
Log:
r16237 at catbus: nickm | 2007-10-28 15:45:25 -0400
Tidy v2 hidden service descriptor format code: fix memory leaks, fix reference problems, note magic numbers, note questions, remove redundant checks, remove a possible stack smashing bug when encoding a descriptor with no protocols supported.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r16237] on 8246c3cf-6607-4228-993b-4d95d33730f1
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-10-28 19:48:14 UTC (rev 12254)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-10-28 19:48:16 UTC (rev 12255)
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
command to establish the stream rather than the normal BEGIN. Now
we can make anonymized begin_dir connections for (e.g.) more secure
hidden service posting and fetching.
+ - Code to parse and generate new hidden service descriptor format
+ (From Karsten Loesing.)
o Major bugfixes:
- Stop servers from crashing if they set a Family option (or
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2007-10-28 19:48:14 UTC (rev 12254)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2007-10-28 19:48:16 UTC (rev 12255)
@@ -3372,7 +3372,7 @@
/** Information used to connect to a hidden service. */
typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t {
crypto_pk_env_t *pk; /**< This service's public key. */
- int version; /**< 0 or 2. */
+ int version; /**< Version of the descriptor format: 0 or 2. */
time_t timestamp; /**< Time when the descriptor was generated. */
uint16_t protocols; /**< Bitmask: which rendezvous protocols are supported?
* (We allow bits '0', '1', and '2' to be set.) */
@@ -3388,6 +3388,9 @@
extend_info_t **intro_point_extend_info;
strmap_t *intro_keys; /**< map from intro node hexdigest to key; only
* used for versioned hidden service descriptors. */
+
+ /* XXXX020 Refactor n_intro_points, intro_points, intro_point_extend_info,
+ * and intro_keys into a list of intro points. */
} rend_service_descriptor_t;
int rend_cmp_service_ids(const char *one, const char *two);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/rendcommon.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/rendcommon.c 2007-10-28 19:48:14 UTC (rev 12254)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/rendcommon.c 2007-10-28 19:48:16 UTC (rev 12255)
@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@
return strcasecmp(one,two);
}
+/** Helper: Release the storage held by the intro key in <b>_ent</b>.
+ */
+/*XXXX020 there's also one of these in rendservice.c */
+static void
+intro_key_free(void *_ent)
+{
+ crypto_pk_env_t *ent = _ent;
+ crypto_free_pk_env(ent);
+}
+
/** Free the storage held by the service descriptor <b>desc</b>.
*/
void
@@ -40,29 +50,37 @@
}
tor_free(desc->intro_point_extend_info);
}
+ if (desc->intro_keys) {
+ strmap_free(desc->intro_keys, intro_key_free);
+ }
tor_free(desc);
}
-/* Length of a binary-encoded rendezvous service ID. */
+/** Length of a binary-encoded rendezvous service ID. */
+/*XXXX020 Rename to include "len" and maybe not "binary" */
#define REND_SERVICE_ID_BINARY 10
-/* Length of the time period that is used to encode the secret ID part of
+/** Length of the time period that is used to encode the secret ID part of
* versioned hidden service descriptors. */
+/*XXXX020 Rename to include "len" and maybe not "binary" */
#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_BINARY 4
-/* Length of the descriptor cookie that is used for versioned hidden
+/** Length of the descriptor cookie that is used for versioned hidden
* service descriptors. */
+/* XXXX020 rename to REND_DESC_COOKIE_(BINARY_)LEN */
#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_BINARY 16
-/* Length of the replica number that is used to determine the secret ID
+/** Length of the replica number that is used to determine the secret ID
* part of versioned hidden service descriptors. */
+/* XXXX020 rename to REND_REPLICA_(BINARY_)LEN */
#define REND_REPLICA_BINARY 1
-/* Length of the base32-encoded secret ID part of versioned hidden service
+/** Length of the base32-encoded secret ID part of versioned hidden service
* descriptors. */
+/*XXXX020 Rename to include "len" */
#define REND_SECRET_ID_PART_BASE32 32
-/* Compute the descriptor ID for <b>service_id</b> of length
+/** Compute the descriptor ID for <b>service_id</b> of length
* <b>REND_SERVICE_ID_BINARY</b> and <b>secret_id_part</b> of length
* <b>DIGEST_LEN</b>, and write it to <b>descriptor_id_out</b> of length
* <b>DIGEST_LEN</b>. */
@@ -78,17 +96,18 @@
crypto_free_digest_env(digest);
}
-/* Compute the secret ID part for <b>time_period</b> of length
- * <b>REND_TIME_PERIOD_BINARY</b>, <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length
+/** Compute the secret ID part for time_period,
+ * a <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length
* <b>REND_DESC_COOKIE_BINARY</b> which may also be <b>NULL</b> if no
* descriptor_cookie shall be used, and <b>replica</b>, and write it to
* <b>secret_id_part</b> of length DIGEST_LEN. */
static void
-get_secret_id_part_bytes(char *secret_id_part, const char *time_period,
+get_secret_id_part_bytes(char *secret_id_part, uint32_t time_period,
const char *descriptor_cookie, uint8_t replica)
{
crypto_digest_env_t *digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, time_period, REND_TIME_PERIOD_BINARY);
+ time_period = htonl(time_period);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)&time_period, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (descriptor_cookie) {
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, descriptor_cookie,
REND_DESC_COOKIE_BINARY);
@@ -98,36 +117,37 @@
crypto_free_digest_env(digest);
}
-/* Compute the time period bytes for time <b>now</b> plus a potentially
- * intended <b>deviation</b> of one or more periods, and the first byte of
- * <b>service_id</b>, and write it to <b>time_period</b> of length 4. */
-static void
-get_time_period_bytes(char *time_period, time_t now, uint8_t deviation,
- const char *service_id)
+/** Return the time period for time <b>now</b> plus a potentially
+ * intended <b>deviation</b> of one or more periods, based on the first byte
+ * of <b>service_id</b>. */
+static uint32_t
+get_time_period(time_t now, uint8_t deviation, const char *service_id)
{
- uint32_t host_order =
- (uint32_t)
+ /* The time period is the number of REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY
+ * intervals that have passed since the epoch, offset slightly so that
+ * each service's time periods start and end at a fraction of that
+ * period based on their first byte. */
+ return (uint32_t)
(now + ((uint8_t) *service_id) * REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY / 256)
/ REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY + deviation;
- uint32_t network_order = htonl(host_order);
- set_uint32(time_period, network_order);
}
-/* Compute the time in seconds that a descriptor that is generated
+/** Compute the time in seconds that a descriptor that is generated
* <b>now</b> for <b>service_id</b> will be valid. */
static uint32_t
get_seconds_valid(time_t now, const char *service_id)
{
uint32_t result = REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY -
- (uint32_t)
- (now + ((uint8_t) *service_id) * REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY / 256)
- % REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY;
+ ((uint32_t)
+ (now + ((uint8_t) *service_id) * REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY / 256)
+ % REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY);
return result;
}
-/* Compute the binary <b>desc_id</b> for a given base32-encoded
- * <b>service_id</b> and binary encoded <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length
- * 16 that may be <b>NULL</b> at time <b>now</b> for replica number
+/** Compute the binary <b>desc_id_out</b> (DIGEST_LEN bytes long) for a given
+ * base32-encoded <b>service_id</b> and optional unencoded
+ * <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length REND_DESC_COOKIE_BINARY,
+ * at time <b>now</b> for replica number
* <b>replica</b>. <b>desc_id</b> needs to have <b>DIGEST_LEN</b> bytes
* free. Return 0 for success, -1 otherwise. */
int
@@ -136,8 +156,8 @@
uint8_t replica)
{
char service_id_binary[REND_SERVICE_ID_BINARY];
- char time_period[REND_TIME_PERIOD_BINARY];
char secret_id_part[DIGEST_LEN];
+ uint32_t time_period;
if (!service_id ||
strlen(service_id) != REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not compute v2 descriptor ID: "
@@ -158,7 +178,7 @@
return -1;
}
/* Calculate current time-period. */
- get_time_period_bytes(time_period, now, 0, service_id_binary);
+ time_period = get_time_period(now, 0, service_id_binary);
/* Calculate secret-id-part = h(time-period + replica). */
get_secret_id_part_bytes(secret_id_part, time_period, descriptor_cookie,
replica);
@@ -167,45 +187,46 @@
return 0;
}
-/* Encode the introduction points in <b>desc</b>, optionally encrypt them
- * with <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length 16 that may also be <b>NULL</b>,
- * write them to a newly allocated string, and write a pointer to it to
- * <b>ipos_base64</b>. Return 0 for success, -1 otherwise. */
+/* Encode the introduction points in <b>desc</b>, optionally encrypt them with
+ * an optional <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of length REND_DESC_COOKIE_BINARY,
+ * encode it in base64, and write it to a newly allocated string, and write a
+ * pointer to it to *<b>ipos_base64</b>. Return 0 for success, -1
+ * otherwise. */
static int
rend_encode_v2_intro_points(char **ipos_base64,
rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
const char *descriptor_cookie)
{
size_t unenc_len;
- char *unenc;
+ char *unenc = NULL;
size_t unenc_written = 0;
- char *enc;
- int enclen;
int i;
- crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher;
+ int r = -1;
/* Assemble unencrypted list of introduction points. */
+ *ipos_base64 = NULL;
unenc_len = desc->n_intro_points * 1000; /* too long, but ok. */
unenc = tor_malloc_zero(unenc_len);
for (i = 0; i < desc->n_intro_points; i++) {
- char id_base32[32 + 1];
- char *onion_key;
+ char id_base32[32 + 1]; /*XXXX020 should be a macro */
+ char *onion_key = NULL;
size_t onion_key_len;
crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key;
- char *service_key;
+ char *service_key = NULL;
+ char *addr = NULL;
size_t service_key_len;
int res;
- char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2];
+ char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2]; /* includes $ and NUL. */
/* Obtain extend info with introduction point details. */
extend_info_t *info = desc->intro_point_extend_info[i];
/* Encode introduction point ID. */
- base32_encode(id_base32, 32 + 1, info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base32_encode(id_base32, sizeof(id_base32),
+ info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
/* Encode onion key. */
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(info->onion_key, &onion_key,
&onion_key_len) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not write onion key.");
- if (onion_key) tor_free(onion_key);
- tor_free(unenc);
- return -1;
+ tor_free(onion_key);
+ goto done;
}
/* Encode intro key. */
hex_digest[0] = '$';
@@ -217,12 +238,12 @@
crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(intro_key, &service_key,
&service_key_len) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not write intro key.");
- if (service_key) tor_free(service_key);
+ tor_free(service_key);
tor_free(onion_key);
- tor_free(unenc);
- return -1;
+ goto done;
}
/* Assemble everything for this introduction point. */
+ addr = tor_dup_addr(info->addr);
res = tor_snprintf(unenc + unenc_written, unenc_len - unenc_written,
"introduction-point %s\n"
"ip-address %s\n"
@@ -230,17 +251,17 @@
"onion-key\n%s"
"service-key\n%s",
id_base32,
- tor_dup_addr(info->addr),
+ addr,
info->port,
onion_key,
service_key);
+ tor_free(addr);
tor_free(onion_key);
tor_free(service_key);
if (res < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Not enough space for writing introduction point "
"string.");
- tor_free(unenc);
- return -1;
+ goto done;
}
/* Update total number of written bytes for unencrypted intro points. */
unenc_written += res;
@@ -249,40 +270,42 @@
if (unenc_len < unenc_written + 2) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Not enough space for finalizing introduction point "
"string.");
- tor_free(unenc);
- return -1;
+ goto done;
}
unenc[unenc_written++] = '\n';
unenc[unenc_written++] = 0;
/* If a descriptor cookie is passed, encrypt introduction points. */
if (descriptor_cookie) {
- enc = tor_malloc_zero(unenc_written + 16);
- cipher = crypto_create_init_cipher(descriptor_cookie, 1);
- enclen = crypto_cipher_encrypt_with_iv(cipher, enc, unenc_written + 16,
- unenc, unenc_written);
+ char *enc = tor_malloc_zero(unenc_written + CIPHER_IV_LEN);
+ crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher =
+ crypto_create_init_cipher(descriptor_cookie, 1);
+ int enclen = crypto_cipher_encrypt_with_iv(cipher, enc,
+ unenc_written + CIPHER_IV_LEN,
+ unenc, unenc_written);
crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
- tor_free(unenc);
if (enclen < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not encrypt introduction point string.");
- if (enc) tor_free(enc);
- return -1;
+ tor_free(enc);
+ goto done;
}
- /* Replace original string by encrypted one. */
+ /* Replace original string with the encrypted one. */
+ tor_free(unenc);
unenc = enc;
unenc_written = enclen;
}
/* Base64-encode introduction points. */
*ipos_base64 = tor_malloc_zero(unenc_written * 2);
- if (base64_encode(*ipos_base64, unenc_written * 2, unenc, unenc_written)
- < 0) {
+ if (base64_encode(*ipos_base64, unenc_written * 2, unenc, unenc_written)<0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not encode introduction point string to "
- "base64.");
- tor_free(unenc);
- tor_free(ipos_base64);
- return -1;
+ "base64.");
+ goto done;
}
+ r = 0;
+ done:
+ if (r<0)
+ tor_free(*ipos_base64);
tor_free(unenc);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
/** Attempt to parse the given <b>desc_str</b> and return true if this
@@ -290,9 +313,9 @@
static int
rend_desc_v2_is_parsable(const char *desc_str)
{
- rend_service_descriptor_t *test_parsed;
+ rend_service_descriptor_t *test_parsed = NULL;
char test_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN];
- char *test_intro_content;
+ char *test_intro_content = NULL;
size_t test_intro_size;
size_t test_encoded_size;
const char *test_next;
@@ -301,7 +324,8 @@
&test_intro_size,
&test_encoded_size,
&test_next, desc_str);
- tor_free(test_parsed);
+ if (test_parsed)
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(test_parsed);
tor_free(test_intro_content);
return (res >= 0);
}
@@ -322,7 +346,7 @@
const char *descriptor_cookie, uint8_t period)
{
char service_id[DIGEST_LEN];
- char time_period[REND_TIME_PERIOD_BINARY];
+ uint32_t time_period;
char *ipos_base64 = NULL;
int k;
uint32_t seconds_valid;
@@ -333,14 +357,14 @@
/* Obtain service_id from public key. */
crypto_pk_get_digest(desc->pk, service_id);
/* Calculate current time-period. */
- get_time_period_bytes(time_period, now, period, service_id);
+ time_period = get_time_period(now, period, service_id);
/* Determine how many seconds the descriptor will be valid. */
seconds_valid = period * REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY +
get_seconds_valid(now, service_id);
/* Assemble, possibly encrypt, and encode introduction points. */
if (rend_encode_v2_intro_points(&ipos_base64, desc, descriptor_cookie) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Encoding of introduction points did not succeed.");
- if (ipos_base64) tor_free(ipos_base64);
+ tor_free(ipos_base64);
return -1;
}
/* Encode REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS descriptors. */
@@ -349,14 +373,14 @@
char secret_id_part_base32[REND_SECRET_ID_PART_BASE32 + 1];
char *desc_id;
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_BASE32 + 1];
- char *permanent_key;
+ char *permanent_key = NULL;
size_t permanent_key_len;
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
int i;
char protocol_versions_string[16]; /* max len: "0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7\0" */
size_t protocol_versions_written;
size_t desc_len;
- char *desc_str;
+ char *desc_str = NULL;
int result = 0;
size_t written = 0;
char desc_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -375,7 +399,7 @@
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(desc->pk, &permanent_key,
&permanent_key_len) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write public key to string.");
- if (permanent_key) tor_free(permanent_key);
+ tor_free(permanent_key);
goto err;
}
/* Encode timestamp. */
@@ -389,7 +413,10 @@
protocol_versions_written += 2;
}
}
- protocol_versions_string[protocol_versions_written - 1] = 0;
+ if (protocol_versions_written)
+ protocol_versions_string[protocol_versions_written - 1] = '\0';
+ else
+ protocol_versions_string[0]= '\0';
/* Assemble complete descriptor. */
desc_len = 2000 + desc->n_intro_points * 1000; /* far too long, but ok. */
desc_str = tor_malloc_zero(desc_len);
@@ -412,14 +439,14 @@
tor_free(permanent_key);
if (result < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Descriptor ran out of room.");
- if (desc_str) tor_free(desc_str);
+ tor_free(desc_str);
goto err;
}
written = result;
/* Add signature. */
strlcpy(desc_str + written, "signature\n", desc_len - written);
written += strlen(desc_str + written);
- desc_str[written] = '\0';
+ desc_str[written] = '\0'; /* XXXX020 strlcpy always nul-terminates. */
if (crypto_digest(desc_digest, desc_str, written) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "could not create digest.");
tor_free(desc_str);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/rendservice.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/rendservice.c 2007-10-28 19:48:14 UTC (rev 12254)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/rendservice.c 2007-10-28 19:48:16 UTC (rev 12255)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
return smartlist_len(rend_service_list);
}
-/** Release the storage held by the intro key in <b>_ent</b>.
+/** Helper: Release the storage held by the intro key in <b>_ent</b>.
*/
static void
intro_key_free(void *_ent)
@@ -302,12 +302,11 @@
origin_circuit_t *circ;
int i,n;
routerinfo_t *router;
-
if (service->desc) {
rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
service->desc = NULL;
}
- d = service->desc = tor_malloc(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
+ d = service->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
d->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(service->private_key);
d->timestamp = time(NULL);
d->version = 1;
@@ -317,7 +316,23 @@
d->intro_point_extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*n);
/* We support intro protocol 2 and protocol 0. */
d->protocols = (1<<2) | (1<<0);
- d->intro_keys = service->intro_keys;
+
+ if (service->intro_keys) {
+ /* We need to copy keys so that they're not deleted when we free the
+ * descriptor. */
+ strmap_iter_t *iter;
+ d->intro_keys = strmap_new();
+ for (iter = strmap_iter_init(service->intro_keys); !strmap_iter_done(iter);
+ iter = strmap_iter_next(service->intro_keys, iter)) {
+ const char *key;
+ void *val;
+ crypto_pk_env_t *k;
+ strmap_iter_get(iter, &key, &val);
+ k = val;
+ strmap_set(d->intro_keys, key, crypto_pk_dup_key(k));
+ }
+ }
+
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
const char *name = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i);
router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/routerparse.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/routerparse.c 2007-10-28 19:48:14 UTC (rev 12254)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/routerparse.c 2007-10-28 19:48:16 UTC (rev 12255)
@@ -315,22 +315,22 @@
/** List of tokens allowable in rendezvous service descriptors */
static token_rule_t desc_token_table[] = {
- T1("rendezvous-service-descriptor", R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR, EQ(1), \
- NO_OBJ),
+ T1_START("rendezvous-service-descriptor", R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR,
+ EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("version", R_VERSION, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("permanent-key", R_PERMANENT_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024),
T1("secret-id-part", R_SECRET_ID_PART, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("publication-time", R_PUBLICATION_TIME, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ),
T1("protocol-versions", R_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("introduction-points", R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ),
- T1("signature", R_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ),
+ T1_END("signature", R_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ),
END_OF_TABLE
};
/** List of tokens allowed in the (encrypted) list of introduction points of
* rendezvous service descriptors */
static token_rule_t ipo_token_table[] = {
- T1("introduction-point", R_IPO_IDENTIFIER, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
+ T1_START("introduction-point", R_IPO_IDENTIFIER, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("ip-address", R_IPO_IP_ADDRESS, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("onion-port", R_IPO_ONION_PORT, EQ(1), NO_OBJ),
T1("onion-key", R_IPO_ONION_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024),
@@ -3166,13 +3166,13 @@
}
/** Parse and validate the ASCII-encoded v2 descriptor in <b>desc</b>,
- * write the parsed descriptor to the newly allocated <b>parsed</b>, the
- * binary descriptor ID of length DIGEST_LEN to <b>desc_id</b>, the
+ * write the parsed descriptor to the newly allocated *<b>parsed_out</b>, the
+ * binary descriptor ID of length DIGEST_LEN to <b>desc_id_out</b>, the
* encrypted introduction points to the newly allocated
- * <b>intro_points_encrypted</b>, their encrypted size to
- * <b>intro_points_encrypted_size</b>, the size of the encoded descriptor
- * to <b>encoded_size</b>, and a pointer to the possibly next
- * descriptor to <b>next</b>; return 0 for success (including validation)
+ * *<b>intro_points_encrypted_out</b>, their encrypted size to
+ * *<b>intro_points_encrypted_size_out</b>, the size of the encoded descriptor
+ * to *<b>encoded_size_out</b>, and a pointer to the possibly next
+ * descriptor to *<b>next_now</b>; return 0 for success (including validation)
* and -1 for failure.
*/
int
@@ -3229,16 +3229,12 @@
goto err;
}
/* Check whether descriptor starts correctly. */
- tok = smartlist_get(tokens, 0);
- if (tok->tp != R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Entry does not start with "
- "\"rendezvous-service-descriptor\"");
- goto err;
- }
/* Parse base32-encoded descriptor ID. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR);
tor_assert(tok);
+ tor_assert(tok == smartlist_get(tokens, 0));
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
+ /*XXXX020 magic 32. */
if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != 32 ||
strspn(tok->args[0], BASE32_CHARS) != 32) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid descriptor ID: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
@@ -3255,7 +3251,7 @@
tor_assert(tok);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
result->version = atoi(tok->args[0]);
- if (result->version < 2) {
+ if (result->version < 2) { /*XXXX020 what if > 2? */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Wrong descriptor version: %d", result->version);
goto err;
}
@@ -3268,6 +3264,7 @@
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_SECRET_ID_PART);
tor_assert(tok);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
+ /* XXXX020 magic 32. */
if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != 32 ||
strspn(tok->args[0], BASE32_CHARS) != 32) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid secret ID part: '%s'", tok->args[0]);
@@ -3295,16 +3292,19 @@
smartlist_split_string(versions, tok->args[0], ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(versions); i++) {
+ /* XXXX020 validate the numbers here. */
version = atoi(smartlist_get(versions, i));
result->protocols |= 1 << version;
}
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(versions);
/* Parse encrypted introduction points. Don't verify. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS);
tor_assert(tok);
- *intro_points_encrypted_out = tor_malloc_zero(tok->object_size);
- memcpy(*intro_points_encrypted_out, tok->object_body, tok->object_size);
+ /* XXXX020 make sure it's "BEGIN MESSAGE", not "BEGIN SOMETHINGELSE" */
+ *intro_points_encrypted_out = tok->object_body;
*intro_points_encrypted_size_out = tok->object_size;
+ tok->object_body = NULL; /* Prevent free. */
/* Parse and verify signature. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_SIGNATURE);
tor_assert(tok);
@@ -3351,7 +3351,7 @@
const char *intro_points_encrypted,
size_t intro_points_encrypted_size)
{
- char *ipos_decrypted;
+ char *ipos_decrypted = NULL;
const char **current_ipo;
smartlist_t *intropoints;
smartlist_t *tokens;
@@ -3375,7 +3375,7 @@
intro_points_encrypted_size);
crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
if (unenclen < 0) {
- if (ipos_decrypted) tor_free(ipos_decrypted);
+ tor_free(ipos_decrypted);
return -1;
}
intro_points_encrypted = ipos_decrypted;
@@ -3385,7 +3385,12 @@
current_ipo = (const char **)&intro_points_encrypted;
intropoints = smartlist_create();
tokens = smartlist_create();
- parsed->intro_keys = strmap_new();
+ if (parsed->intro_keys) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Parsing list of introduction points for the same "
+ "hidden service, twice.");
+ } else {
+ parsed->intro_keys = strmap_new();
+ }
while (!strcmpstart(*current_ipo, "introduction-point ")) {
/* Determine end of string. */
const char *eos = strstr(*current_ipo, "\nintroduction-point ");
@@ -3413,6 +3418,7 @@
/* Parse identifier. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_IPO_IDENTIFIER);
tor_assert(tok);
+ /* XXXX020 magic 32. */
if (base32_decode(info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN,
tok->args[0], 32) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Identity digest contains illegal characters: %s",
@@ -3434,6 +3440,7 @@
info->addr = ntohl(ip.s_addr);
/* Parse onion port. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_IPO_ONION_PORT);
+ /* XXXX020 validate range. */
info->port = (uint16_t) atoi(tok->args[0]);
/* Parse onion key. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_IPO_ONION_KEY);
@@ -3447,6 +3454,7 @@
smartlist_add(intropoints, info);
}
/* Write extend infos to descriptor. */
+ /* XXXX020 what if intro_points (&tc) are already set? */
parsed->n_intro_points = smartlist_len(intropoints);
parsed->intro_point_extend_info =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t *) * parsed->n_intro_points);
More information about the tor-commits
mailing list