[or-cvs] r12159: Fix logic for downloading consensuses: make getting an dupli (in tor/trunk: . doc src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Wed Oct 24 19:53:11 UTC 2007
Author: nickm
Date: 2007-10-24 15:53:11 -0400 (Wed, 24 Oct 2007)
New Revision: 12159
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c
tor/trunk/src/or/networkstatus.c
Log:
r16112 at catbus: nickm | 2007-10-24 15:52:03 -0400
Fix logic for downloading consensuses: make getting an duplicate or not-currently-valid consensus count as a failure. Make running out of time to get certificates count as a failure. Delay while fetching certificates.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r16112] on 8246c3cf-6607-4228-993b-4d95d33730f1
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-10-24 19:53:08 UTC (rev 12158)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-10-24 19:53:11 UTC (rev 12159)
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
and download operations.
- Reattempt certificate downloads immediately on failure, as long as
we haven't failed a threshold number of times yet.
+ - Delay retrying consensus downloads while we're downloading
+ certificates to verify the one we just got. Also, count getting a
+ consensus that we already have (or one that isn't valid) as a failure,
+ and count failing to get the certificates after 20 minutes as a
+ failure.
o Minor features (router descriptor cache):
- If we find a cached-routers file that's been sitting around for more
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-10-24 19:53:08 UTC (rev 12158)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-10-24 19:53:11 UTC (rev 12159)
@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@
do more than that. I think some servers are forgetting the results
of their first test, and then never seeing use.
- - Before 0.2.0.9-alpha (for nickm)
+ o Before 0.2.0.9-alpha (for nickm)
o Retry cert downloads as appropriate
- - Delay consensus download retry when there's a unverified consensus we're
+ o Delay consensus download retry when there's a unverified consensus we're
downloading the certs to check
- - But don't delay forever.
+ o But don't delay forever.
o Make new download types comply with should_delay_dir_fetches()
o When DownloadExtraInfo is turned on for the first time, don't flip
out and download the ancient history of the universe.
@@ -63,14 +63,14 @@
- Proposals:
. 101: Voting on the Tor Directory System (plus 103)
. Validate information properly.
- - Dump certificates with the wrong time. Or just warn?
- - When checking a consensus, make sure that its times are plausible.
+ . Dump certificates with the wrong time. Or just warn?
+ . When checking a consensus, make sure that its times are plausible.
. Start caching consensus documents once authorities make them;
start downloading consensus documents once caches serve
them
- - Code to delay next download while fetching certificates to verify
+ o Code to delay next download while fetching certificates to verify
a consensus we already got.
- - Code to retry consensus download if we got one we already have.
+ o Code to retry consensus download if we got one we already have.
- Use if-modified-since on consensus download
- Use if-modified-since on certificate download
- Controller support
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c 2007-10-24 19:53:08 UTC (rev 12158)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/directory.c 2007-10-24 19:53:11 UTC (rev 12159)
@@ -1449,6 +1449,7 @@
"'%s:%d'",(int) body_len, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(body, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse fetched certificates");
+ connection_dir_download_cert_failed(conn, status_code);
} else {
directory_info_has_arrived(now, 0);
log_info(LD_DIR, "Successfully loaded certificates from fetch.");
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/networkstatus.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/networkstatus.c 2007-10-24 19:53:08 UTC (rev 12158)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/networkstatus.c 2007-10-24 19:53:11 UTC (rev 12159)
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
* have enough certificates to be happy about. */
static networkstatus_vote_t *consensus_waiting_for_certs = NULL;
static char *consensus_waiting_for_certs_body = NULL;
+static time_t consensus_waiting_for_certs_set_at = 0;
+static int consensus_waiting_for_certs_dl_failed = 0;
/** The last time we tried to download a networkstatus, or 0 for "never". We
* use this to rate-limit download attempts for directory caches (including
@@ -951,6 +953,8 @@
/**DOCDOC*/
#define CONSENSUS_NETWORKSTATUS_MAX_DL_TRIES 8
+/**DOCDOC*/
+#define DELAY_WHILE_FETCHING_CERTS (20*60)
/** If we want to download a fresh consensus, launch a new download as
* appropriate. */
@@ -971,6 +975,17 @@
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS))
return; /* There's an in-progress download.*/
+ if (consensus_waiting_for_certs) {
+ if (consensus_waiting_for_certs_set_at + DELAY_WHILE_FETCHING_CERTS > now)
+ return; /* We're still getting certs for this one. */
+ else {
+ if (!consensus_waiting_for_certs_dl_failed) {
+ download_status_failed(&consensus_dl_status, 0);
+ consensus_waiting_for_certs_dl_failed=1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS,
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL, NULL, 1);
}
@@ -1153,7 +1168,9 @@
* <b>consensus</b>. If we don't have enough certificates to validate it,
* store it in consensus_waiting_for_certs and launch a certificate fetch.
*
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. On -1, caller should increment
+ * the failure count as appropriate.
+ */
int
networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, int from_cache,
int was_waiting_for_certs)
@@ -1170,6 +1187,20 @@
goto done;
}
+ if (current_consensus &&
+ !memcmp(c->networkstatus_digest, current_consensus->networkstatus_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ /* We already have this one. That's a failure. */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Got a consensus we already have");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (current_consensus && c->valid_after <= current_consensus->valid_after) {
+ /* We have a newer one. */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Got a consensus at least as old as the one we have");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
consensus_fname = get_datadir_fname("cached-consensus");
unverified_fname = get_datadir_fname("unverified-consensus");
@@ -1187,34 +1218,33 @@
tor_free(consensus_waiting_for_certs_body);
consensus_waiting_for_certs = c;
consensus_waiting_for_certs_body = tor_strdup(consensus);
- /*XXXX020 delay next update. NMNM */
+ consensus_waiting_for_certs_set_at = now;
+ consensus_waiting_for_certs_dl_failed = 0;
if (!from_cache) {
write_str_to_file(unverified_fname, consensus, 0);
}
authority_certs_fetch_missing(c, now);
+ /* This case is not a success or a failure until we get the certs
+ * or fail to get the certs. */
+ result = 0;
} else {
/* Even if we had enough signatures, we'd never use this as the
* latest consensus. */
if (was_waiting_for_certs && from_cache)
unlink(unverified_fname);
}
- download_status_reset(&consensus_dl_status); /*XXXX020 not quite right.*/
- result = 0;
goto done;
- } else {
- /* This can never be signed enough Kill it. */
+ } else {
+ /* This can never be signed enough: Kill it. */
if (!was_waiting_for_certs)
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Not enough good signatures on networkstatus "
"consensus");
- if (was_waiting_for_certs && from_cache)
+ if (was_waiting_for_certs && (r < -1) && from_cache)
unlink(unverified_fname);
- networkstatus_vote_free(c);
goto done;
}
}
- download_status_reset(&consensus_dl_status); /*XXXX020 not quite right.*/
-
/* XXXX020 check dates for plausibility. Don't trust a consensus whose
* valid-after date is very far in the future. */
@@ -1233,10 +1263,21 @@
consensus_waiting_for_certs = NULL;
if (consensus != consensus_waiting_for_certs_body)
tor_free(consensus_waiting_for_certs_body);
+ consensus_waiting_for_certs_set_at = 0;
+ consensus_waiting_for_certs_dl_failed = 0;
unlink(unverified_fname);
}
+ /* Reset the failure count only if this consensus is actually valid. */
+ if (c->valid_after <= now && now <= c->valid_until) {
+ download_status_reset(&consensus_dl_status);
+ } else {
+ if (!from_cache)
+ download_status_failed(&consensus_dl_status, 0);
+ }
+
current_consensus = c;
+ c = NULL; /* Prevent free. */
update_consensus_networkstatus_fetch_time(now);
dirvote_recalculate_timing(get_options(), now);
@@ -1253,6 +1294,8 @@
result = 0;
done:
+ if (c)
+ networkstatus_vote_free(c);
tor_free(consensus_fname);
tor_free(unverified_fname);
return result;
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