[or-cvs] r12386: Send and parse link_auth cells properly. (in tor/trunk: . doc src/common src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Mon Nov 5 19:19:46 UTC 2007
Author: nickm
Date: 2007-11-05 14:19:46 -0500 (Mon, 05 Nov 2007)
New Revision: 12386
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.c
tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.h
tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
Log:
r16432 at catbus: nickm | 2007-11-05 14:18:57 -0500
Send and parse link_auth cells properly.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r16432] on 8246c3cf-6607-4228-993b-4d95d33730f1
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
o Keep copies of X509 certs around, not necessarily associated with
connection.
- LINK_AUTH cells
- . Code to generate
+ o Code to generate
o Remember certificate digests from TLS
o Code to parse and check
- Unit tests
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
- Revised handshake: post-TLS.
o If in 'handshaking' state (since v2+ conn is in use), accept
VERSIONS and NETINFO and CERT and LINK_AUTH.
- - After we send NETINFO, send CERT and LINK_AUTH if needed.
+ o After we send NETINFO, send CERT and LINK_AUTH if needed.
- Once we get a good LINK_AUTH, the connection is OPEN.
- Ban most cell types on a non-OPEN connection.
o Make code work right wrt TLS context rotation.
Modified: tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.c 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.c 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
SSL_CTX *ctx;
X509 *my_cert;
X509 *my_id_cert;
+ crypto_pk_env_t *key;
} tor_tls_context_t;
/** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only
@@ -355,6 +356,7 @@
SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
X509_free(ctx->my_cert);
X509_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(ctx->key);
tor_free(ctx);
}
}
@@ -410,6 +412,7 @@
result->refcnt = 1;
result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert);
result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert);
+ result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
#ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES
/* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */
@@ -735,6 +738,13 @@
}
/** DOCDOC */
+crypto_pk_env_t *
+tor_tls_dup_private_key(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return crypto_pk_dup_key(tls->context->key);
+}
+
+/** DOCDOC */
char *
tor_tls_encode_my_certificate(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *size_out,
int conn_cert)
Modified: tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.h 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/src/common/tortls.h 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
char *peer_digest_out);
char *tor_tls_encode_my_certificate(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *size_out,
int conn_cert);
+crypto_pk_env_t *tor_tls_dup_private_key(tor_tls_t *tls);
int tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
int tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int tolerance);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/command.c 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/command.c 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -432,15 +432,22 @@
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Couldn't find a version in common; defaulting to v1.");
- /*XXXX020 just break the connection?*/
+ /*XXXX020 just break the connection! */
conn->link_proto = 1;
return;
}
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
- if (highest_supported_version >= 2)
+ if (highest_supported_version >= 2) {
+ /*XXXX020 check return values. */
connection_or_send_netinfo(conn);
+ connection_or_send_cert(conn);
+ if (conn->handshake_state->started_here)
+ connection_or_send_link_auth(conn);
+ } else {
+ /* XXXX020 finish v1 verification. */
+ }
}
/** Process a 'netinfo' cell. DOCDOC say more. */
@@ -576,6 +583,7 @@
{
or_handshake_state_t *s;
char hmac[DIGEST_LEN];
+ uint16 len;
size_t sig_len;
const char *sig;
char *checked = NULL;
@@ -599,7 +607,13 @@
"closing the connection");
goto err;
}
- if (cell->payload[0] != 0x00) {
+ len = ntohs(get_uint16(cell.payload));
+ if (len < 2 || 2+len > CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad length field (%d) on LINK_AUTH cell;"
+ " closing the connection", (int)len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cell->payload[2] != 0x00) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Unrecognized LINK_AUTH signature "
"version; closing the connection");
goto err;
@@ -608,9 +622,8 @@
tor_assert(s->signing_key);
- /*XXXX020 these two are wrong; fix when protocol is revised. */
- sig = cell->payload+1;
- sig_len = 128;
+ sig = cell->payload+3;
+ sig_len = len-1;
checked = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(s->signing_key));
checked_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(s->signing_key,checked,sig,sig_len);
if (checked_len < 0) {
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -980,4 +980,47 @@
return 0;
}
+/**DOCDOC*/
+int
+connection_or_send_cert(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ /*XXX020 implement.*/
+ return 0;
+}
+/**DOCDOC*/
+int
+connection_or_send_link_auth(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ cell_t cell;
+ char hmac[DIGEST_LEN];
+ crypto_pk_env_t *key;
+ int r, len;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(conn->tls);
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->started_here == 1);
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->received_certs == 1);
+
+ memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell));
+ cell.command = CELL_LINK_AUTH;
+ key = tor_tls_dup_private_key(conn->tls);
+ connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(conn, hmac);
+
+ cell.payload[2] = 0x00; /* Signature version */
+ r = crypto_pk_private_sign(key, cell.payload+3, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
+ crypto_free_pk_env(key);
+ if (r<0)
+ return -1;
+ len = r + 1;
+
+ set_uint16(cell.payload, htons(len));
+
+ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
+
+ /* XXXX020 at this point, as a client, we can consider ourself
+ * authenticated. */
+ return 0;
+}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2007-11-05 18:15:56 UTC (rev 12385)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2007-11-05 19:19:46 UTC (rev 12386)
@@ -2780,7 +2780,7 @@
int connection_or_send_destroy(uint16_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn,
int reason);
int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn);
-int connection_or_send_certs(or_connection_t *conn);
+int connection_or_send_cert(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_link_auth(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(or_connection_t *conn,
char *hmac_out);
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