[or-cvs] r11274: backport the load balancing stuff. man, i hope i got all of (in tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches: . src/or)
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Sat Aug 25 21:42:31 UTC 2007
Author: arma
Date: 2007-08-25 17:42:31 -0400 (Sat, 25 Aug 2007)
New Revision: 11274
Modified:
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/ChangeLog
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/circuitbuild.c
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/config.c
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/or.h
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/routerlist.c
Log:
backport the load balancing stuff. man, i hope i got all
of this right. other people should check too.
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/ChangeLog 2007-08-25 21:31:34 UTC (rev 11273)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/ChangeLog 2007-08-25 21:42:31 UTC (rev 11274)
@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
deprecated since Tor 0.1.1.1-alpha, and keeping it safe and secure
has been more of a headache than it's worth.
+ o Major bugfixes (load balancing):
+ - When choosing nodes for non-guard positions, weight guards
+ proportionally less, since they already have enough load. Patch
+ from Mike Perry.
+ - Raise the "max believable bandwidth" from 1.5MB/s to 10MB/s. This
+ will allow fast Tor servers to get more attention.
+ - When we're upgrading from an old Tor version, forget our current
+ guards and pick new ones according to the new weightings. These
+ three load balancing patches could raise effective network capacity
+ by a factor of four. Thanks to Mike Perry for measurements.
+
o Major bugfixes (stream expiration):
- Expire not-yet-successful application streams in all cases if
they've been around longer than SocksTimeout. Right now there are
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/circuitbuild.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2007-08-25 21:31:34 UTC (rev 11273)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2007-08-25 21:42:31 UTC (rev 11274)
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
- router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1);
+ router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1, 0);
} else {
/* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
* possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
/* XXX sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
* exit node is down. we should pick it anyway. */
- router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1);
+ router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1, 0);
if (router)
break;
}
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/config.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/config.c 2007-08-25 21:31:34 UTC (rev 11273)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/config.c 2007-08-25 21:42:31 UTC (rev 11274)
@@ -3994,16 +3994,18 @@
if (entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, msg)<0) {
return -1;
}
- if (state->TorVersion) {
+ if (state->EntryGuards && state->TorVersion) {
tor_version_t v;
if (tor_version_parse(state->TorVersion, &v)) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Can't parse Tor version '%s' from your state "
"file. Proceeding anyway.", state->TorVersion);
} else { /* take action based on v */
- if (tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.1.10-alpha") &&
- !tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.1.16-rc-cvs")) {
- log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Detected state file from buggy version '%s'. "
- "Enabling workaround to choose working entry guards.",
+ if ((tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.1.10-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.1.2.17")) ||
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(state->TorVersion, "0.2.0.6-alpha"))) {
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Detected state file from old version '%s'. "
+ "Choosing new entry guards for you.",
state->TorVersion);
config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
state->EntryGuards = NULL;
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/or.h 2007-08-25 21:31:34 UTC (rev 11273)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/or.h 2007-08-25 21:42:31 UTC (rev 11274)
@@ -2903,7 +2903,8 @@
int router_is_unreliable(routerinfo_t *router, int need_uptime,
int need_capacity, int need_guard);
uint32_t router_get_advertised_bandwidth(routerinfo_t *router);
-routerinfo_t *routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit);
+routerinfo_t *routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit,
+ int for_guard);
routerstatus_t *routerstatus_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl);
routerinfo_t *router_choose_random_node(const char *preferred,
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/routerlist.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/routerlist.c 2007-08-25 21:31:34 UTC (rev 11273)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/src/or/routerlist.c 2007-08-25 21:42:31 UTC (rev 11274)
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@
/** Do not weight any declared bandwidth more than this much when picking
* routers by bandwidth. */
-#define MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH 1500000 /* 1.5 MB/sec */
+#define MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH 10000000 /* 10 MB/sec */
/** Helper function:
* choose a random element of smartlist <b>sl</b>, weighted by
@@ -945,28 +945,35 @@
* routerinfo_t's. Otherwise it's a list of routerstatus_t's.
*
* If <b>for_exit</b>, we're picking an exit node: consider all nodes'
- * bandwidth equally regardless of their Exit status. If not <b>for_exit</b>,
+ * bandwidth equally regardless of their Exit status, since there may be
+ * some in the list because they exit to obscure ports. If not <b>for_exit</b>,
* we're picking a non-exit node: weight exit-node's bandwidth downwards
* depending on the smallness of the fraction of Exit-to-total bandwidth.
+ *
+ * If <b>for_guard</b>, we're picking a guard node: consider all guard's
+ * bandwidth equally. Otherwise, weight guards proportionally less.
*/
static void *
-smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int statuses)
+smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
+ int statuses)
{
int i;
routerinfo_t *router;
- routerstatus_t *status;
+ routerstatus_t *status=NULL;
int32_t *bandwidths;
int is_exit;
+ int is_guard;
uint64_t total_nonexit_bw = 0, total_exit_bw = 0, total_bw = 0;
+ uint64_t total_nonguard_bw = 0, total_guard_bw = 0;
uint64_t rand_bw, tmp;
double exit_weight;
+ double guard_weight;
int n_unknown = 0;
- int include_exits = 1;
/* First count the total bandwidth weight, and make a list
* of each value. <0 means "unknown; no routerinfo." We use the
* bits of negative values to remember whether the router was fast (-x)&1
- * and whether it was an exit (-x)&2. Yes, it's a hack. */
+ * and whether it was an exit (-x)&2 or guard (-x)&4. Yes, it's a hack. */
bandwidths = tor_malloc(sizeof(int32_t)*smartlist_len(sl));
/* Iterate over all the routerinfo_t or routerstatus_t, and */
@@ -980,16 +987,19 @@
status = smartlist_get(sl, i);
router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest);
is_exit = status->is_exit;
+ is_guard = status->is_possible_guard;
if (router) {
this_bw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(router);
} else { /* guess */
is_known = 0;
flags = status->is_fast ? 1 : 0;
flags |= is_exit ? 2 : 0;
+ flags |= is_guard ? 4 : 0;
}
} else {
router = smartlist_get(sl, i);
is_exit = router->is_exit;
+ is_guard = router->is_possible_guard;
this_bw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(router);
}
/* if they claim something huge, don't believe it */
@@ -997,6 +1007,10 @@
this_bw = MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH;
if (is_known) {
bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX
+ if (is_guard)
+ total_guard_bw += this_bw;
+ else
+ total_nonguard_bw += this_bw;
if (is_exit)
total_exit_bw += this_bw;
else
@@ -1025,11 +1039,16 @@
if (bw>=0)
continue;
is_exit = ((-bw)&2);
+ is_guard = ((-bw)&4);
bandwidths[i] = ((-bw)&1) ? avg_fast : avg_slow;
if (is_exit)
total_exit_bw += bandwidths[i];
else
total_nonexit_bw += bandwidths[i];
+ if (is_guard)
+ total_guard_bw += bandwidths[i];
+ else
+ total_nonguard_bw += bandwidths[i];
}
}
@@ -1039,41 +1058,53 @@
return smartlist_choose(sl);
}
- /* Figure out how to weight exits. */
- if (for_exit) {
- /* If we're choosing an exit node, exit bandwidth counts fully. */
- exit_weight = 1.0;
- total_bw = total_exit_bw + total_nonexit_bw;
- } else {
+ /* Figure out how to weight exits and guards. */
+ {
double all_bw = U64_TO_DBL(total_exit_bw+total_nonexit_bw);
double exit_bw = U64_TO_DBL(total_exit_bw);
+ double guard_bw = U64_TO_DBL(total_guard_bw);
/*
* For detailed derivation of this formula, see
* http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jul-2007/msg00056.html
*/
- exit_weight = 1.0 - all_bw/(3.0*exit_bw);
- if (exit_weight <= 0.0) {
- include_exits = 0;
+ if (for_exit)
+ exit_weight = 1.0;
+ else
+ exit_weight = 1.0 - all_bw/(3.0*exit_bw);
+
+ if (for_guard)
+ guard_weight = 1.0;
+ else
+ guard_weight = 1.0 - all_bw/(3.0*guard_bw);
+
+ if (exit_weight <= 0.0)
exit_weight = 0.0;
- total_bw = total_nonexit_bw;
- } else {
- include_exits = 1;
- total_bw = 0;
- for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
- if (statuses) {
- status = smartlist_get(sl, i);
- is_exit = status->is_exit;
- } else {
- router = smartlist_get(sl, i);
- is_exit = router->is_exit;
- }
- if (is_exit)
- total_bw += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight));
- else
- total_bw += bandwidths[i];
+
+ if (guard_weight <= 0.0)
+ guard_weight = 0.0;
+
+ total_bw = 0;
+ for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
+ if (statuses) {
+ status = smartlist_get(sl, i);
+ is_exit = status->is_exit;
+ is_guard = status->is_possible_guard;
+ } else {
+ router = smartlist_get(sl, i);
+ is_exit = router->is_exit;
+ is_guard = router->is_possible_guard;
}
+ if (is_exit && is_guard)
+ total_bw += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight * guard_weight));
+ else if (is_guard)
+ total_bw += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * guard_weight));
+ else if (is_exit)
+ total_bw += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight));
+ else
+ total_bw += bandwidths[i];
}
}
+
/*
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Total bw = "U64_FORMAT", total exit bw = "U64_FORMAT
", total nonexit bw = "U64_FORMAT", exit weight = %lf "
@@ -1091,14 +1122,23 @@
if (statuses) {
status = smartlist_get(sl, i);
is_exit = status->is_exit;
+ is_guard = status->is_possible_guard;
} else {
router = smartlist_get(sl, i);
is_exit = router->is_exit;
+ is_guard = router->is_possible_guard;
}
- if (is_exit)
+
+ /* Weights can be 0 if not counting guards/exits */
+ if (is_exit && is_guard)
+ tmp += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight * guard_weight));
+ else if (is_guard)
+ tmp += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * guard_weight));
+ else if (is_exit)
tmp += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight));
else
tmp += bandwidths[i];
+
if (tmp >= rand_bw)
break;
}
@@ -1116,18 +1156,19 @@
* the advertised bandwidth of each router.
*/
routerinfo_t *
-routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit)
+routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard)
{
- return smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, for_exit, 0);
+ return smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, for_exit, for_guard, 0);
}
/** Choose a random element of status list <b>sl</b>, weighted by
- * the advertised bandwidth of each status.
+ * the advertised bandwidth of each status. Avoid putting load on
+ * exits and guards.
*/
routerstatus_t *
routerstatus_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl)
{
- return smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1, 1);
+ return smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 0, 0, 1);
}
/** Return a random running router from the routerlist. If any node
@@ -1184,7 +1225,8 @@
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedsmartlist);
if (need_capacity || need_guard)
- choice = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, weight_for_exit);
+ choice = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, weight_for_exit,
+ need_guard);
else
choice = smartlist_choose(sl);
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