[or-cvs] r8582: Partial implementation of revised nickname syntax for contro (in tor/trunk: . doc src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Tue Oct 3 18:58:43 UTC 2006
Author: nickm
Date: 2006-10-03 14:58:40 -0400 (Tue, 03 Oct 2006)
New Revision: 8582
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
tor/trunk/src/or/router.c
tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c
tor/trunk/src/or/test.c
Log:
r8838 at totoro: nickm | 2006-10-02 15:24:39 -0400
Partial implementation of revised nickname syntax for controllers. Implement ability to look up routers by "verbose" nicknames; add a per-v1-control-connection flag to turn the feature on in events. Needs testing, spec, ability to actually turn on the flag, double-checking that we wont overflow any nickname buffers, and changelog.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/branches/verbose-nicknames [r8838] on 96637b51-b116-0410-a10e-9941ebb49b64
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -44,12 +44,20 @@
o Implement
o Note that we'd like a better speed-bump too.
o Bug 336: CIRC events should have digests when appropriate.
-N - figure out the right thing to do when telling nicknames to
- controllers. We should always give digest, and possibly sometimes give
- nickname? Or digest, and nickname, with indication of whether name is
- canonical?
+N - Improve behavior when telling nicknames and digests to controllers.
+ We should give digest, and nickname, with indication of whether name is
+ canonical.
- edmanm likes $DIGEST~nickname for unNamed routers, and
$DIGEST=nickname for Named routers. So do I.
+ o Make the code accept it where we currently ask for the nickname of
+ another server. Semantics should be strict to start ($D=N means, "give
+ me the Named server with digest D named N"; $D~N means "give me a
+ server with digest D named N". Nothing else matches.)
+ o Add ability to selectively send 'long' nicknames on v1 connections.
+ - Add a feature to actually turn on the switch.
+ - Verify that everything actually does the right thing.
+ - Specify everything.
+
N - Bug 326: make eventdns thrash less.
N - Test guard unreachable logic; make sure that we actually attempt to
connect to guards that we think are unreachable from time to time.
@@ -161,10 +169,10 @@
fractional uptime).
- AKA Track uptime as %-of-time-up, as well as time-since-last-down
- - Clients should prefer to avoid exit nodes for non-exit path positions.
+ o Clients should prefer to avoid exit nodes for non-exit path positions.
(bug 200)
-R - spec
-x - implement
+ o spec
+ o implement
- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
x - spec
@@ -189,6 +197,15 @@
- update dir-spec with what we decided for each of these
N - provide no-cache no-index headers from the dirport?
+ - Specify
+ - cacheing
+ - Single network-statuses, single descriptors, "all", "authority",
+ and v1 directory stuff are all cacheable for a short time.
+ - Multiple network-statuses or descriptors are not cacheable.
+ - Be sure to be correct wrt HTTP/1.0
+ - indexing
+ - robots.txt
+ - Implement
- Windows server usability
- Solve the ENOBUFS problem.
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -159,6 +159,49 @@
return s;
}
+/* DOCDOC long names only */
+char *
+circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_create();
+ crypt_path_t *hop;
+ char *elt, *s;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+
+ hop = circ->cpath;
+ do {
+ if (!hop)
+ break;
+ if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
+ break;
+ if (!hop->extend_info)
+ break;
+ elt = tor_malloc(MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
+ if ((ri = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
+ router_get_verbose_nickname(elt, ri);
+ } else if (hop->extend_info->nickname &&
+ is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
+ elt[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ elt[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]= '~';
+ strlcpy(elt+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2,
+ hop->extend_info->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
+ } else {
+ elt[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+ smartlist_add(elements, elt);
+ hop = hop->next;
+ } while (hop != circ->cpath);
+
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(elements);
+ return s;
+}
+
/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
* circ's cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
* exit point.
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/control.c 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/control.c 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@
* list to find out.
**/
static uint32_t global_event_mask0 = 0;
-static uint32_t global_event_mask1 = 0;
+static uint32_t global_event_mask1long = 0;
+static uint32_t global_event_mask1short = 0;
/** True iff we have disabled log messages from being sent to the controller */
static int disable_log_messages = 0;
@@ -119,9 +120,13 @@
/** Macro: true if any control connection is interested in events of type
* <b>e</b>. */
#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING0(e) (global_event_mask0 & (1<<(e)))
-#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1(e) (global_event_mask1 & (1<<(e)))
-#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(e) \
- ((global_event_mask0|global_event_mask1) & (1<<(e)))
+#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1(e) \
+ ((global_event_mask1long|global_event_mask1short) & (1<<(e)))
+#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1L(e) (global_event_mask1long & (1<<(e)))
+#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1S(e) (global_event_mask1short & (1<<(e)))
+#define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(e) \
+ ((global_event_mask0|global_event_mask1short|global_event_mask1long) \
+ & (1<<(e)))
/** If we're using cookie-type authentication, how long should our cookies be?
*/
@@ -132,6 +137,10 @@
static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0;
static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN];
+typedef enum {
+ SHORT_NAMES,LONG_NAMES,ALL_NAMES
+} name_type_t;
+
static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn,
const char *format, ...)
CHECK_PRINTF(2,3);
@@ -148,8 +157,9 @@
const char *message);
static void send_control0_event(uint16_t event, uint32_t len,
const char *body);
-static void send_control1_event(uint16_t event, const char *format, ...)
- CHECK_PRINTF(2,3);
+static void send_control1_event(uint16_t event, name_type_t which,
+ const char *format, ...)
+ CHECK_PRINTF(3,4);
static int handle_control_setconf(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
char *body);
static int handle_control_resetconf(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
@@ -238,7 +248,8 @@
connection_t **conns;
int n_conns, i;
global_event_mask0 = 0;
- global_event_mask1 = 0;
+ global_event_mask1short = 0;
+ global_event_mask1long = 0;
get_connection_array(&conns, &n_conns);
for (i = 0; i < n_conns; ++i) {
if (conns[i]->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL &&
@@ -246,8 +257,10 @@
control_connection_t *conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conns[i]);
if (STATE_IS_V0(conn->_base.state))
global_event_mask0 |= conn->event_mask;
+ else if (conn->use_long_names)
+ global_event_mask1long |= conn->event_mask;
else
- global_event_mask1 |= conn->event_mask;
+ global_event_mask1short |= conn->event_mask;
}
}
@@ -587,7 +600,7 @@
/* Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code
* <b>event</b>. The event's body is given by <b>msg</b>. */
static void
-send_control1_event_string(uint16_t event, const char *msg)
+send_control1_event_string(uint16_t event, name_type_t which, const char *msg)
{
connection_t **conns;
int n_conns, i;
@@ -600,6 +613,13 @@
!conns[i]->marked_for_close &&
conns[i]->state == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN_V1) {
control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conns[i]);
+ if (which == SHORT_NAMES) {
+ if (control_conn->use_long_names)
+ continue;
+ } else if (which == LONG_NAMES) {
+ if (! control_conn->use_long_names)
+ continue;
+ }
if (control_conn->event_mask & (1<<event)) {
connection_write_to_buf(msg, strlen(msg), TO_CONN(control_conn));
if (event == EVENT_ERR_MSG)
@@ -616,7 +636,7 @@
* Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the
* ending \n\r\0. */
static void
-send_control1_event(uint16_t event, const char *format, ...)
+send_control1_event(uint16_t event, name_type_t which, const char *format, ...)
{
#define SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE 1024
int r;
@@ -636,7 +656,7 @@
buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r';
}
- send_control1_event_string(event, buf);
+ send_control1_event_string(event, which, buf);
}
/** Given a text circuit <b>id</b>, return the corresponding circuit. */
@@ -2661,12 +2681,14 @@
int
control_event_circuit_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp)
{
- char *path, *msg;
+ char *path=NULL, *msg;
if (!EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS))
return 0;
tor_assert(circ);
- path = circuit_list_path(circ,0);
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING0(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS) ||
+ EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1S(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS))
+ path = circuit_list_path(circ,0);
if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING0(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS)) {
size_t path_len = strlen(path);
msg = tor_malloc(1+4+path_len+1); /* event, circid, path, NUL. */
@@ -2690,10 +2712,20 @@
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unrecognized status code %d", (int)tp);
return 0;
}
- send_control1_event(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS,
- "650 CIRC %lu %s %s\r\n",
- (unsigned long)circ->global_identifier,
- status, path);
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1S(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS)) {
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS, SHORT_NAMES,
+ "650 CIRC %lu %s %s\r\n",
+ (unsigned long)circ->global_identifier,
+ status, path);
+ }
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1L(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS)) {
+ char *vpath = circuit_list_path_for_controller(circ);
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS, LONG_NAMES,
+ "650 CIRC %lu %s %s\r\n",
+ (unsigned long)circ->global_identifier,
+ status, vpath);
+ tor_free(vpath);
+ }
}
tor_free(path);
@@ -2766,7 +2798,7 @@
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
if (circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
- send_control1_event(EVENT_STREAM_STATUS,
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_STREAM_STATUS, ALL_NAMES,
"650 STREAM %lu %s %lu %s\r\n",
(unsigned long)conn->global_identifier, status,
origin_circ?
@@ -2813,7 +2845,7 @@
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unrecognized status code %d", (int)tp);
return 0;
}
- send_control1_event(EVENT_OR_CONN_STATUS,
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_OR_CONN_STATUS, ALL_NAMES/*XXXX NM*/,
"650 ORCONN %s %s\r\n",
name, status);
}
@@ -2833,7 +2865,7 @@
send_control0_event(EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED, 8, buf);
}
if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1(EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED)) {
- send_control1_event(EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED,
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED, ALL_NAMES,
"650 BW %lu %lu\r\n",
(unsigned long)n_read,
(unsigned long)n_written);
@@ -2907,7 +2939,7 @@
default: s = "UnknownLogSeverity"; break;
}
++disable_log_messages;
- send_control1_event(event, "650 %s %s\r\n", s, b?b:msg);
+ send_control1_event(event, ALL_NAMES, "650 %s %s\r\n", s, b?b:msg);
--disable_log_messages;
tor_free(b);
}
@@ -2922,34 +2954,55 @@
{
size_t len;
char *msg;
- smartlist_t *identities;
+ smartlist_t *identities = NULL;
char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
if (!EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_NEW_DESC))
return 0;
- identities = smartlist_create();
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
- {
- base16_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),r->cache_info.identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN);
- smartlist_add(identities, tor_strdup(buf));
- });
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING0(EVENT_NEW_DESC) ||
+ EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1S(EVENT_NEW_DESC)) {
+ identities = smartlist_create();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
+ {
+ base16_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),r->cache_info.identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(identities, tor_strdup(buf));
+ });
+ }
if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING0(EVENT_NEW_DESC)) {
msg = smartlist_join_strings(identities, ",", 0, &len);
send_control0_event(EVENT_NEW_DESC, len+1, msg);
tor_free(msg);
}
- if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1(EVENT_NEW_DESC)) {
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1S(EVENT_NEW_DESC)) {
char *ids = smartlist_join_strings(identities, " ", 0, &len);
size_t len = strlen(ids)+32;
msg = tor_malloc(len);
tor_snprintf(msg, len, "650 NEWDESC %s\r\n", ids);
- send_control1_event_string(EVENT_NEW_DESC, msg);
+ send_control1_event_string(EVENT_NEW_DESC, SHORT_NAMES, msg);
tor_free(ids);
tor_free(msg);
}
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(identities, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(identities);
-
+ if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING1L(EVENT_NEW_DESC)) {
+ smartlist_t *names;
+ names = smartlist_create();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
+ char *b = tor_malloc(MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
+ smartlist_add(names, b);
+ });
+ char *ids = smartlist_join_strings(names, " ", 0, &len);
+ size_t len = strlen(ids)+32;
+ msg = tor_malloc(len);
+ tor_snprintf(msg, len, "650 NEWDESC %s\r\n", ids);
+ send_control1_event_string(EVENT_NEW_DESC, LONG_NAMES, msg);
+ tor_free(ids);
+ tor_free(msg);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(names, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(names);
+ }
+ if (identities) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(identities, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(identities);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -2962,12 +3015,13 @@
return 0;
if (expires < 3)
- send_control1_event(EVENT_ADDRMAP,
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_ADDRMAP, ALL_NAMES,
"650 ADDRMAP %s %s NEVER\r\n", from, to);
else {
char buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
format_local_iso_time(buf,expires);
- send_control1_event(EVENT_ADDRMAP, "650 ADDRMAP %s %s \"%s\"\r\n",
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_ADDRMAP, ALL_NAMES,
+ "650 ADDRMAP %s %s \"%s\"\r\n",
from, to, buf);
}
@@ -3005,7 +3059,7 @@
buf = tor_malloc(totallen);
strlcpy(buf, firstline, totallen);
strlcpy(buf+strlen(firstline), esc, totallen);
- send_control1_event_string(EVENT_AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS, buf);
+ send_control1_event_string(EVENT_AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS, ALL_NAMES, buf);
tor_free(esc);
tor_free(buf);
@@ -3018,7 +3072,7 @@
int
control_event_my_descriptor_changed(void)
{
- send_control1_event(EVENT_DESCCHANGED, "650 DESCCHANGED\r\n");
+ send_control1_event(EVENT_DESCCHANGED, ALL_NAMES, "650 DESCCHANGED\r\n");
return 0;
}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@
#define MAX_NICKNAME_LEN 19
/* Hex digest plus dollar sign. */
#define MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN (HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1)
+/* $Hexdigest=nickname */
+#define MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN (1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)
+
/** Maximum size, in bytes, for resized buffers. */
#define MAX_BUF_SIZE ((1<<24)-1)
#define MAX_DIR_SIZE MAX_BUF_SIZE
@@ -783,6 +786,9 @@
uint32_t event_mask; /**< Bitfield: which events does this controller
* care about? */
+ unsigned int use_long_names:1; /**< True if we should use long nicknames
+ * on this (v1) connection. Only settable
+ * via v1 controllers. */
uint32_t incoming_cmd_len;
uint32_t incoming_cmd_cur_len;
char *incoming_cmd;
@@ -1680,6 +1686,7 @@
/********************************* circuitbuild.c **********************/
char *circuit_list_path(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose);
+char *circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain,
origin_circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ);
@@ -2504,6 +2511,7 @@
int is_legal_nickname(const char *s);
int is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(const char *s);
int is_legal_hexdigest(const char *s);
+void router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, routerinfo_t *router);
void router_reset_warnings(void);
void router_free_all(void);
@@ -2547,6 +2555,7 @@
V1_AUTHORITY, V2_AUTHORITY, HIDSERV_AUTHORITY,
} authority_type_t;
routerstatus_t *router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type,
+
int requireother,
int fascistfirewall,
int retry_if_no_servers);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/router.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/router.c 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/router.c 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -1306,10 +1306,30 @@
tor_assert(s);
if (s[0] == '$') s++;
len = strlen(s);
- return (len == HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
- strspn(s,HEX_CHARACTERS)==len);
+ if (len > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
+ if (s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=' ||
+ s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '~') {
+ if (!is_legal_nickname(s+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return (len >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
+ strspn(s,HEX_CHARACTERS)==HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
}
+/** DOCDOC buf must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes. */
+void
+router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, routerinfo_t *router)
+{
+ buf[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = router->is_named ? '=' : '~';
+ strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
+}
+
/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
* warn again if we see the same errors. */
void
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/routerlist.c 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -1033,13 +1033,25 @@
router_hex_digest_matches(routerinfo_t *router, const char *hexdigest)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ size_t len;
tor_assert(hexdigest);
if (hexdigest[0] == '$')
++hexdigest;
- if (strlen(hexdigest) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
- base16_decode(digest, DIGEST_LEN, hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0)
+ len = strlen(hexdigest);
+ if (len < HEX_DIGEST_LEN)
return 0;
+ else if (len > HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
+ (hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=' ||
+ hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '~')) {
+ if (strcasecmp(hexdigest+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname))
+ return 0;
+ if (hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=' && !router->is_named)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (base16_decode(digest, DIGEST_LEN, hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0)
+ return 0;
return (!memcmp(digest, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
}
@@ -1079,7 +1091,7 @@
!strcasecmp(nickname, get_options()->Nickname))
return router_get_my_routerinfo();
- maybedigest = (strlen(nickname) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN) &&
+ maybedigest = (strlen(nickname) >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN) &&
(base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,nickname,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0);
if (named_server_map &&
@@ -1096,7 +1108,10 @@
} else if (maybedigest &&
!memcmp(digest, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)
) {
- return router;
+ if (router_hex_digest_matches(router, nickname))
+ return router;
+ else
+ best_match = router; // XXXX NM not exactly right.
}
});
@@ -1190,17 +1205,35 @@
router_get_by_hexdigest(const char *hexdigest)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ size_t len;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
tor_assert(hexdigest);
if (!routerlist)
return NULL;
if (hexdigest[0]=='$')
++hexdigest;
- if (strlen(hexdigest) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ len = strlen(hexdigest);
+ if (len < HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,hexdigest,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) < 0)
return NULL;
- return router_get_by_digest(digest);
+ ri = router_get_by_digest(digest);
+
+ if (len > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
+ if (hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=') {
+ if (strcasecmp(ri->nickname, hexdigest+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1) ||
+ !ri->is_named)
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '~') {
+ if (strcasecmp(ri->nickname, hexdigest+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1))
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ri;
}
/** Return the router in our routerlist whose 20-byte key digest
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/test.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/test.c 2006-10-03 05:45:58 UTC (rev 8581)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/test.c 2006-10-03 18:58:40 UTC (rev 8582)
@@ -1269,19 +1269,40 @@
test_assert( is_legal_nickname("a"));
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname(""));
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname("abcdefghijklmnopqrst")); /* 20 chars */
- test_assert(!is_legal_nickname("abcdefghijklmnopqrst")); /* 20 chars */
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname("hyphen-")); /* bad char */
test_assert( is_legal_nickname("abcdefghijklmnopqrs")); /* 19 chars */
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname("$AAAAAAAA01234AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"));
/* valid */
test_assert( is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
"$AAAAAAAA01234AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"));
+ test_assert( is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAA01234AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=fred"));
+ test_assert( is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAA01234AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~fred"));
/* too short */
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
"$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"));
/* illegal char */
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
"$AAAAAAzAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"));
+ /* hex part too long */
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"));
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=fred"));
+ /* Bad nickname */
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA="));
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~"));
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~hyphen-"));
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~"
+ "abcdefghijklmnoppqrst"));
+ /* Bad extra char. */
+ test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(
+ "$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!"));
test_assert(is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest("xyzzy"));
test_assert(is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest("abcdefghijklmnopqrs"));
test_assert(!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest("abcdefghijklmnopqrst"));
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