[or-cvs] r8958: Check in an implementation of "test" connections from Scott (in tor/trunk: . src/or)

nickm at seul.org nickm at seul.org
Fri Nov 17 03:34:48 UTC 2006


Author: nickm
Date: 2006-11-16 22:34:44 -0500 (Thu, 16 Nov 2006)
New Revision: 8958

Modified:
   tor/trunk/
   tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
   tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
   tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
Log:
 r9560 at Kushana:  nickm | 2006-11-16 22:09:12 -0500
 Check in an implementation of "test" connections from Scott Squires:
 these connections immediately close upon reaching Tor.  They're useful
 for apps that want to check whether they're talking to the same Tor as
 a given controller.  (I'll be tweaking this a bit before I push.)
 



Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
 svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r9560] on c95137ef-5f19-0410-b913-86e773d04f59

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c	2006-11-16 19:32:26 UTC (rev 8957)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c	2006-11-17 03:34:44 UTC (rev 8958)
@@ -1440,6 +1440,13 @@
     return -1;
   } /* else socks handshake is done, continue processing */
 
+  if (hostname_is_a_test_address(socks->address))
+  {
+    control_event_teststream(conn);
+    connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
   if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT)
     control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
   else
@@ -2450,3 +2457,16 @@
     return BAD_HOSTNAME;
 }
 
+/** Check if the address is of the form "y.test"
+ */
+int
+hostname_is_a_test_address(char *address)
+{
+  char *s;
+  s = strrchr(address,'.');
+  if (!s)
+    return 0;
+  if (!strcmp(s+1,"test"))
+    return 1;
+  return 0;
+}

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/control.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/control.c	2006-11-16 19:32:26 UTC (rev 8957)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/control.c	2006-11-17 03:34:44 UTC (rev 8958)
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@
 #define EVENT_STATUS_CLIENT    0x0010
 #define EVENT_STATUS_SERVER    0x0011
 #define EVENT_STATUS_GENERAL   0x0012
-#define _EVENT_MAX             0x0012
+#define EVENT_TESTSTREAM       0x0013
+#define _EVENT_MAX             0x0013
 /* If _EVENT_MAX ever hits 0x0020, we need to make the mask wider. */
 
 /** Array mapping from message type codes to human-readable message
@@ -1063,6 +1064,8 @@
           event_code = EVENT_STATUS_CLIENT;
         else if (!strcasecmp(ev, "STATUS_SERVER"))
           event_code = EVENT_STATUS_SERVER;
+        else if (!strcasecmp(ev, "TESTSTREAM"))
+          event_code = EVENT_TESTSTREAM;
         else {
           connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "552 Unrecognized event \"%s\"\r\n",
                                    ev);
@@ -3544,6 +3547,17 @@
   return r;
 }
 
+/** Called when a request is made for a hostname ending in .test
+ */
+int
+control_event_teststream(edge_connection_t *conn)
+{
+  send_control1_event(EVENT_TESTSTREAM, ALL_NAMES|ALL_FORMATS,
+                      "650 TESTSTREAM %s\r\n",
+                      conn->socks_request->address);
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /** Choose a random authentication cookie and write it to disk.
  * Anybody who can read the cookie from disk will be considered
  * authorized to use the control connection. */

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h	2006-11-16 19:32:26 UTC (rev 8957)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h	2006-11-17 03:34:44 UTC (rev 8958)
@@ -2034,6 +2034,7 @@
   NORMAL_HOSTNAME, ONION_HOSTNAME, EXIT_HOSTNAME, BAD_HOSTNAME
 } hostname_type_t;
 hostname_type_t parse_extended_hostname(char *address);
+int hostname_is_a_test_address(char *address);
 
 /********************************* connection_or.c ***************************/
 
@@ -2141,6 +2142,7 @@
   CHECK_PRINTF(2,3);
 int control_event_server_status(int severity, const char *format, ...)
   CHECK_PRINTF(2,3);
+int control_event_teststream(edge_connection_t *conn);
 
 int init_cookie_authentication(int enabled);
 int decode_hashed_password(char *buf, const char *hashed);



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