[or-cvs] r9133: Add internal documentation for a bunch of configuration opti (in tor/trunk: . doc src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Fri Dec 15 21:27:21 UTC 2006
Author: nickm
Date: 2006-12-15 16:27:19 -0500 (Fri, 15 Dec 2006)
New Revision: 9133
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
Log:
r11598 at Kushana: nickm | 2006-12-15 15:59:00 -0500
Add internal documentation for a bunch of configuration options. We should do something to keep this list, the canonical list, the tor.1 list, and the torrc.complete list in sync.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r11598] on c95137ef-5f19-0410-b913-86e773d04f59
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2006-12-15 21:26:23 UTC (rev 9132)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2006-12-15 21:27:19 UTC (rev 9133)
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
- Ongoing work on eventdns infrastructure: add dns server and ipv6
support.
- Make PIDFile work on Windows (untested).
+ - Add internal descriptions for a bunch of configuration options:
+ accessible via controller interface and in comments in saved
+ options files.
o Security bugfixes:
- Stop sending the HttpProxyAuthenticator string to directory
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2006-12-15 21:26:23 UTC (rev 9132)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2006-12-15 21:27:19 UTC (rev 9133)
@@ -294,23 +294,25 @@
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort
o even if your torrc lists yourself in your myfamily line, don't list it in
the descriptor.
- - Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
+ . Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
- Don't let 'newnym' be triggered more often than every n seconds.
o change log_fn() to log() on notice/warn/err logs where we can.
X If we try to publish as a nickname that's already claimed, should
we append a number (or increment the number) and try again? This
way people who read their logs can fix it as before, but people
who don't read their logs will still offer Tor servers.
- - Fall back to unnamed; warn user; send controller event.
+? - Fall back to unnamed; warn user; send controller event.
! - Tor should bind its ports before dropping privs, so users don't
have to do the ipchains dance.
- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
also introduces DoS opportunities.
-! - The bw_accounting file should get merged into the state file.
- - Streamline how we pick entry nodes.
-! - Better installers and build processes.
- - Commit edmanm's win32 makefile to tor contrib, or write a new one.
+ o The bw_accounting file should get merged into the state file.
+? - Streamline how we pick entry nodes.
+ o Better installers and build processes.
+ X Commit edmanm's win32 makefile to tor contrib, or write a new one.
+ (Abandoned for now; mingw is now our official windows build
+ enviroment.)
- Christian Grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type
which is used for the first N data cells, and only
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2006-12-15 21:26:23 UTC (rev 9132)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2006-12-15 21:27:19 UTC (rev 9133)
@@ -300,8 +300,168 @@
} config_var_description_t;
static config_var_description_t options_description[] = {
+ /* ==== general options */
+ /* AvoidDiskWrites */
+ { "BandwidthRate", "A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth on "
+ "this node to the specified number of bytes per second." },
+ { "BandwidthBurst", "Limit the maximum token buffer size (also known as "
+ "burst) to the given number of bytes." },
+ { "ConnLimit", "Maximum number of simultaneous sockets allowed." },
+ /* ControlListenAddress */
+ { "ControlPort", "If set, Tor will accept connections from the same machine "
+ "(localhost only) on this port, and allow those connections to control "
+ "the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol (described in"
+ "control-spec.txt).", },
+ { "CookieAuthentication", "If this option is set to 1, don't allow any "
+ "connections to the control port except when the connecting process "
+ "can read a file that Tor creates in its data directory. " },
+ { "DataDirectory", "Store working data, state, keys, and caches here." },
+ { "DirServer", "Tor only trusts directories signed with one of these "
+ "servers' keys. Used to override the standard list of directory "
+ "authorities." },
+ /* { "FastFirstHopPK", "" }, */
+ /* FetchServerDescriptors, FetchHidServDescriptors,
+ * FetchUselessDescriptors */
+ { "Group", "On startup, setgid to this group." },
+ { "HardwareAccel", "If set, Tor tries to use hardware crypto accelerators "
+ "when it can." },
+ /* HashedControlPassword */
+ { "HTTPProxy", "Force Tor to make all HTTP directory requests through this "
+ "host:port (or host:80 if port is not set)." },
+ { "HTTPProxyAuthenticator", "A username:password pair to be used with "
+ "HTTPProxy." },
+ { "HTTPSProxy", "Force Tor to make all TLS (SSL) connectinos through this "
+ "host:port (or host:80 if port is not set)." },
+ { "HTTPSProxyAuthenticator", "A username:password pair to be used with "
+ "HTTPSProxy." },
+ { "KeepalivePeriod", "Send a padding cell every N seconds to keep firewalls "
+ "from closing our connections while Tor is not in use." },
+ { "Log", "Where to send logging messages. Format is "
+ "minSeverity[-maxSeverity] (stderr|stdout|syslog|file FILENAME)." },
+ { "OutboundBindAddress", "Make all outbound connections originate from the "
+ "provided IP address (only usefol for multiple network interfaces)." },
+ { "PIDFile", "On startup, write our PID to this file. On clean shutdown, "
+ "remove the file." },
+ /* ProtocolWarnings */
+ /* RephistTrackTime */
+ { "RunAsDaemon", "If set, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background when "
+ "started. Unix only." },
+ { "SafeLogging", "If set to 0, Tor logs potentially sensitive strings "
+ "rather than replacing them with the string [scrubbed]." },
+ /* TunnelDirConns */
+ { "User", "On startup, setuid to this user" },
+
+ /* ==== client options */
+ { "AllowInvalidNodes", "Where on our circuits should Tor allow servers "
+ "that the directory authorities haven't called \"valid\"?" },
+ /* CircuitBuildTimeout, CircuitIdleTimeout */
+ { "ClientOnly", "If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a "
+ "server, even if ORPort is as configued." },
+ { "EntryNodes", "A list of preferred entry nodes to use for the first hop "
+ "in circuits, if possible." },
+ /* { "EnforceDistinctSubnets" , "" }, */
+ { "ExitNodes", "A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in "
+ "circuits, when possible." },
+ { "ExcludeNodes", "A list of nodes never to use when building a circuit." },
+ { "FascistFirewall", "If set, Tor will only create outgoing connections to "
+ "ORs running on the ports listed in FirewallPorts." },
+ { "FirewallPorts", "A list of ports that we cann connect to. Only used "
+ "when FascistFirewall is set." },
+ { "LongLivedPorts", "A list of ports for services that tend to require "
+ "long-lived connections." },
+ { "MapAddress", "Force Tor to treat all requests for one address as if "
+ "they were for another." },
+ { "NewCircuitPeriod", "Force Tor to consider whether to build a new circuit "
+ "every NUM sections." },
+ { "MaxCircuitDirtiness", "Do not attach new streams to a circuit that has "
+ "been used up to this many seconds ago." },
+ /* NatdPort, NatdListenAddress */
+ { "NodeFamily", "A list of servers that constitute a 'family' and should "
+ "never be used in the same circuit." },
+ { "NumEntryGuards", "How many entry guards should we keep at a time?" },
+ /* PathlenCoinWeight */
+ { "ReachableAddresses", "Addresses we can connect to, as IP/bits:port-port. "
+ "By default, we assume all addresses are reachable." },
+ /* reachablediraddresses, reachableoraddresses. */
+ { "RendNodes", "A list of preferred nodes to use for a rendezvous point, "
+ "if possible." },
+ { "RendExcludenodes", "A list of nodes never to use as rendezvous points." },
+ /* SafeSOCKS */
+ { "SOCKSPort", "The port where we listen for SOCKS connections from "
+ "applications." },
+ { "SOCKSListenAddress", "Bind to this address to listen to connections from "
+ "SOCKS-speaking applications." },
+ { "SOCKSPolicy", "Set an entry policy to limit which addresses can connect "
+ "to the SOCKSPort." },
+ /* SocksTimeout */
+ { "StrictExitNodes", "If set, Tor will fail to operate when none of the "
+ "configured ExitNodes can be used." },
+ { "StrictEntryNodes", "If set, Tor will fail to operate when none of the "
+ "configured EntryNodes can be used." },
+ /* TestSocks */
+ { "TrackHostsExit", "Hosts and domains which should, if possible, be "
+ "acccessed from the same exit node each time we connect to them." },
+ { "TrackHostsExitExpire", "Time after which we forget which exit we were "
+ "using to connect to hosts in TrackHostsExit." },
+ /* "TransPort", "TransListenAddress */
+ { "UseEntryGuards", "Set to 0 if we want to pick from the whole set of "
+ "entry nodes for each server, rather than picking a set of 'Guards' to "
+ "prevent profiling attacks." },
+
+ /* === server options */
{ "Address", "The advertised (external) address we should use." },
- // { "AccountingStart", ""},
+ /* Accounting* options. */
+ /* AssumeReachable */
+ { "ContactInfo", "Administrative contact information to advertise for this "
+ "server." },
+ { "ExitPolicy", "Address/port ranges for which to accept or reject outgoing "
+ "connections on behalf of Tor users." },
+ /* { "ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, "" }, */
+ { "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth", "If set, we will not advertise more than this "
+ "amount of bandwidth for our bandwidth rate, regardless of how much "
+ "bandwidth we actually detect." },
+ { "MaxOnionsPending", "Reject new attempts to extend circuits when we "
+ "already have this many pending." },
+ { "MyFamily", "Declare a list of other servers as belonging to the same "
+ "family as this one, so that clients will not use two from the same "
+ "family in the same circuit." },
+ { "Nickname", "Set the server nickname." },
+ { "NoPublish", "Set to 1 in order to keep the server from uploading info "
+ "to the directory authorities. This prevents clients from using your "
+ "server." },
+ { "NumCPUs", "How many processes to use at once for public-key crypto." },
+ { "ORPort", "Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients "
+ "and servers." },
+ { "ORListenAddress", "Bind to this address to listen for connections from "
+ "clients and servers, instead of the default 0.0.0.0:ORPort." },
+ /* PublishServerDescriptor */
+ /*{ "RedirectExit", "When an outgoing connection tries to connect to a "
+ *"given address, redirect it to another address instead." },
+ */
+ /* ServerDNS: DetectHijacking, ResolvConfFile, SearchDomains */
+ { "ShutdownWaitLength", "Wait this long for clients to finish when "
+ "shutting down because of a SIGINT." },
+ /* { "TestVia", } */
+
+ /* === directory cache optoins */
+ { "DirPort", "Serve directory information from this port, and act as a "
+ "directory cache." },
+ { "DirListenAddress", "Bind to this address to listen for connnections from "
+ "clients and servers, instead of the default 0.0.0.0:DirPort." },
+ { "DirPolicy", "Set a policy to limit who can connect to the directory "
+ "port" },
+
+ /* Authority options: AuthDirBadExit, AuthDirInvalid, AuthDirReject,
+ * AuthDirRejectUnlisted, AuthDirListBadExits, AuthoritativeDirectory,
+ * DirAllowPrivateAddresses, HSAuthoritativeDir,
+ * NamingAuthoritativeDirectory, RecommendedVersions,
+ * RecommendedClientVersions, RecommendedServerVersions, RendPostPeriod,
+ * RunTesting, V1AuthoritativeDirectory, VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory, */
+
+ /* Hidden service options: HiddenService: dir,excludenodes, nodes,
+ * options, port. PublishHidServDescriptor */
+
+ /* Nonpersistent options: __LeaveStreamsUnattached, __AllDirActionsPrivate */
{ NULL, NULL },
};
@@ -327,6 +487,9 @@
"The last entry guard has been unreachable since this time." },
{ "EntryGuardUnlistedSince",
"The last entry guard has been unusable since this time." },
+ { "LastRotatedOnionKey",
+ "The last time at which we changed the medium-term private key used for "
+ "building circuits." },
{ "LastWritten", "When was this state file last regenerated?" },
{ "TorVersion", "Which version of Tor generated this state file?" },
@@ -1915,9 +2078,12 @@
}
/* Allocate and return a new string holding the written-out values of the vars
- * in 'options' If 'minimal', do not write out any default-valued vars. */
+ * in 'options'. If 'minimal', do not write out any default-valued vars.
+ * Else, if comment_defaults, write default values as comments.
+ */
static char *
-config_dump(config_format_t *fmt, void *options, int minimal)
+config_dump(config_format_t *fmt, void *options, int minimal,
+ int comment_defaults)
{
smartlist_t *elements;
or_options_t *defaults;
@@ -1939,6 +2105,7 @@
elements = smartlist_create();
for (i=0; fmt->vars[i].name; ++i) {
+ int comment_option = 0;
if (fmt->vars[i].type == CONFIG_TYPE_OBSOLETE ||
fmt->vars[i].type == CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_S)
continue;
@@ -1947,23 +2114,25 @@
continue;
if (minimal && option_is_same(fmt, options, defaults, fmt->vars[i].name))
continue;
+ else if (comment_defaults &&
+ option_is_same(fmt, options, defaults, fmt->vars[i].name))
+ comment_option = 1;
desc = config_find_description(fmt, fmt->vars[i].name);
line = assigned = get_assigned_option(fmt, options, fmt->vars[i].name);
if (line && desc) {
/* Only dump the description if there's something to describe. */
- size_t len = strlen(desc)+8;
- char *tmp = tor_malloc(len);
- tor_snprintf(tmp, len, "# %s\n",desc);
- smartlist_add(elements, tmp);
+ wrap_string(elements, desc, 78, "# ", "# ");
}
for (; line; line = line->next) {
- size_t len = strlen(line->key) + strlen(line->value) + 3;
+ size_t len = strlen(line->key) + strlen(line->value) + 5;
char *tmp;
tmp = tor_malloc(len);
- if (tor_snprintf(tmp, len, "%s %s\n", line->key, line->value)<0) {
+ if (tor_snprintf(tmp, len, "%s%s %s\n",
+ comment_option ? "# " : "",
+ line->key, line->value)<0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Internal error writing option value");
tor_assert(0);
}
@@ -2000,7 +2169,7 @@
char *
options_dump(or_options_t *options, int minimal)
{
- return config_dump(&options_format, options, minimal);
+ return config_dump(&options_format, options, minimal, 0);
}
/* Return 0 if every element of sl is a string holding a decimal
@@ -2033,8 +2202,7 @@
* services can overload the directory system. */
#define MIN_REND_POST_PERIOD (5*60)
-/** Highest allowable value for DirFetchPeriod, StatusFetchPeriod, and
- * RendPostPeriod. */
+/** Highest allowable value for RendPostPeriod. */
#define MAX_DIR_PERIOD (MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME/2)
/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>options</b> is reasonable, and a
@@ -3974,7 +4142,7 @@
global_state->LastWritten = time(NULL);
tor_free(global_state->TorVersion);
global_state->TorVersion = tor_strdup("Tor " VERSION);
- state = config_dump(&state_format, global_state, 1);
+ state = config_dump(&state_format, global_state, 1, 0);
len = strlen(state)+256;
contents = tor_malloc(len);
format_local_iso_time(tbuf, time(NULL));
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