[or-cvs] inserted all missing urls into volunteer

[phobos at seul.org]

Update of /home/or/cvsroot/website
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv25811

Modified Files:
	volunteer.html 
Log Message:
inserted all missing urls into volunteer


Index: volunteer.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/website/volunteer.html,v
retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -d -r1.6 -r1.7
--- volunteer.html	29 Jun 2005 19:11:27 -0000	1.6
+++ volunteer.html	29 Jun 2005 19:23:25 -0000	1.7
@@ -137,12 +137,8 @@
 sent us code.)</li>
 <li>Investigate privoxy vs. freecap for win32 clients</li>
 <li>Evaluate, create, and <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">document a list of programs</a> that work with Tor.  </li>
-<li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with "fuzz". Determine if there
-good libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by getting credit
-when we put out a new release because of you!</li>
-<li>Website volume fingerprinting attacks (Back et al, Hintz). Defenses
-include a large cell size, defensive dropping, etc. How well does each
-approach work?</li>
+<li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzz</a>"fuzz"</a>. Determine if there good libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>
+<li>Website volume fingerprinting attacks (<a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Back et al</a>, <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hintz02">Hintz</a>). Defenses include a large cell size, <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>, etc. How well does each approach work?</li>
 <li>The end-to-end traffic confirmation attack. We need to study
 long-range dummies more, along with traffic shaping. How much traffic of
 what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary is confident he
@@ -226,8 +222,9 @@
 pseudonyms in practice (say, in case you frequently go to two websites
 and if anybody knew about both of them they would conclude it's you), we
 don't support that well yet. We should find a good approach and
-interface for handling pseudonymous profiles in Tor. See this post and
-followup for details.</li>
+interface for handling pseudonymous profiles in Tor. See <a
+href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Dec-2004/msg00086.html">this
+post</a> and <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2005/msg00007.html">followup</a> for details.</li>
 <li>Congestion control. Is our current design sufficient once we have
 heavy use? Need to measure and tweak, or maybe overhaul.</li>
 </ul>