[or-cvs] TODO: strippd out volunteer items

phobos at seul.org phobos at seul.org
Sun Jun 12 02:16:29 UTC 2005


Update of /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv20904/doc

Modified Files:
	TODO 
Log Message:
TODO:  strippd out volunteer items


Index: TODO
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/TODO,v
retrieving revision 1.321
retrieving revision 1.322
diff -u -d -r1.321 -r1.322
--- TODO	11 Jun 2005 05:37:59 -0000	1.321
+++ TODO	12 Jun 2005 02:16:27 -0000	1.322
@@ -199,94 +199,3 @@
     streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
     we've seen in the wild.
     (Pending a user who needs this)
-
-Volunteer projects:  [Phobos moves these to contribute.html]
-  - use openssl aes when available
-  - do the kernel buffer style design
-  - Server instructions for OSX and Windows operators.
-  - Improve and clarify the wiki entry on port forwarding.
-  - how do ulimits work on win32, anyway?  (We should handle WSAENOBUFS as
-    needed, look at the MaxConnections registry entry, look at the
-    MaxUserPort entry, and look at the TcpTimedWaitDelay entry. We may also
-    want to provide a way to set them as needed. See bug 98.)
-  - Implement reverse DNS (already specified)
-  - It would be nice to have a FirewalledIPs thing that works like
-    FirewallPorts.
-  - Make configure.in handle cross-compilation
-    - Have NULL_REP_IS_ZERO_BYTES default to 1.
-    - Make with-ssl-dir disable search for ssl.
-  - Packaging, docs, etc:
-   - Exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching web proxy.
-  - Have clients and dirservers preserve reputation info over
-    reboots.
-  - Support egd or other non-OS-integrated strong entropy sources
-  - password protection for on-disk identity key
-  - Possible to get autoconf to easily install things into ~/.tor?
-  - server descriptor declares min log level, clients avoid servers
-     that are too loggy.
-  - Separate node discovery from routing to allow neat extensions. [Goodell?]
-    - Add SetServerStatus control event to adjust verified/running status of
-      nodes.
-    - Add NoDownload config option to prevent regular directory downloads
-      from happening.
-  - Choosing exit node by meta-data, e.g. country.
-  - What info squeaks by Privoxy? Are other scrubbers better?
-  - web proxy gateways to let normal people browse hidden services.
-    (This has been done a few times, but nobody has sent us code.)
-  - Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.
-    - Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors
-    - Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests
-    - Signing (and verifying) router descriptors
-    - Signing (and verifying) directories
-    - Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)
-  - Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not a maximum
-    size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as quickly (and kill
-    the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.
-  - Congestion control. Is our current design sufficient once we have heavy
-    use? Need to measure and tweak, or maybe overhaul.
-  - Add alternative versions of crypto.c and tortls.c to use libnss or
-    libgcrypt+gnutls.
-  - If we have a trusted directory on port 80, optionally stop falling back
-    to forbidden ports when fascistfirewall blocks all good dirservers.
-
-
-Research projects: [Phobos moves these to contribute.html]
-  - Arranging membership management for independence.
-    Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.
-    How to gather random sample of nodes.
-    How to handle nodelist recommendations.
-    Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has
-      different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should
-      be treated differently.
-  - Incentives to relay; incentives to exit.
-  - Allowing dissidents to relay through Tor clients.
-  - Experiment with mid-latency systems. How do they impact usability,
-    how do they impact safety?
-  - Understand how powerful fingerprinting attacks are, and experiment
-    with ways to foil them (long-range padding?).
-  - Come up with practical approximations to picking entry and exit in
-    different routing zones.
-  - Find ideal churn rate for helper nodes; how safe is it?
-  - Attacking freenet-gnunet/timing-delay-randomness-arguments.
-  - Is exiting from the middle of the circuit always a bad idea?
-  - IPv6 support (For exit addresses)
-    - Spec issue: if a resolve returns an IP4 and an IP6 address,
-      which to use?
-    - Add to exit policy code
-    - Make tor_gethostbyname into tor_getaddrinfo
-    - Make everything that uses uint32_t as an IP address change to use
-      a generalize address struct.
-    - Change relay cell types to accept new addresses.
-    - Add flag to serverdescs to tell whether IPv6 is supported.
-  - patch tsocks with our current patches + gethostbyname, getpeername, etc.
-  - make freecap (or whichever) do what we want.
-  - scrubbing proxies for protocols other than http.
-  - We need better default privoxy configs to ship.
-  - We need a good scrubbing HTTP proxy; privoxy is unmaintained and sucky.
-  - A DNS proxy would let unmodified socks4/socks5 apps to work well.
-  - Add SOCKS support to more applications
-  - store hidden service information to disk: dirservers forget service
-    descriptors when they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget
-    their chosen intro points when they restart.
-
-



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