[or-cvs] Try to document our current directory thoughts in the spec ...

Nick Mathewson nickm at seul.org
Mon Dec 19 02:52:11 UTC 2005


Update of /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv11979/doc

Modified Files:
	dir-spec.txt 
Log Message:
Try to document our current directory thoughts in the spec before I build them: how novel!

Index: dir-spec.txt
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/dir-spec.txt,v
retrieving revision 1.26
retrieving revision 1.27
diff -u -p -d -r1.26 -r1.27
--- dir-spec.txt	14 Oct 2005 04:56:20 -0000	1.26
+++ dir-spec.txt	19 Dec 2005 02:52:09 -0000	1.27
@@ -4,42 +4,81 @@ $Id$
 
 0. Scope and preliminaries
 
-   This document should eventually be merged into tor-spec.txt and replace
-   the existing notes on directories.
+   This document should eventually be merged to replace and supplement the
+   existing notes on directories in tor-spec.txt.
 
    This is not a finalized version; what we actually wind up implementing
-   may be very different from the system described here.
+   may be different from the system described here.
 
 0.1. Goals
 
-   There are several problems with the way Tor handles directories right
-   now:
-      1. Directories are very large and use a lot of bandwidth.
-      2. Every directory server is a single point of failure.
-      3. Requiring every client to know every server won't scale.
-      4. Requiring every directory cache to know every server won't scale.
-      5. Our current "verified server" system is kind of nonsensical.
-      6. Getting more directory servers adds more points of failure and
+   There are several problems with the way Tor handles directory information
+   in version 0.1.0.x and earlier.  Here are the problems we try to fix with
+   this new design, already partially implemented in 0.1.1.x:
+      1. Directories are very large and use up a lot of bandwidth: clients
+         download descriptors for all router several times an hour.
+      2. Every directory authority is a trust bottleneck: if a single
+         directory authority lies, it can make clients believe for a time an
+         arbitrarily distorted view of the Tor network.
+      3. Our current "verified server" system is kind of nonsensical.
+      4. Getting more directory authorities adds more points of failure and
          worsens possible partitioning attacks.
 
-   This design tries to solve every problem except problems 3 and 4, and to
-   be compatible with likely eventual solutions to problems 3 and 4.
+   There are two problems that remain unaddressed by this design.
+      5. Requiring every client to know about every router won't scale.
+      6. Requiring every directory cache to know every router won't scale.
 
 1. Outline
 
-   There is no longer any such thing as a "signed directory".  Instead,
-   directory servers sign a very compressed 'network status' object that
-   lists the current descriptors and their status, and router descriptors
-   continue to be self-signed by servers.  Clients download network status
-   listings periodically, and download router descriptors as needed.  ORs
-   upload descriptors relatively infrequently.
+   There is a small set (say, around 10) of semi-trusted directory
+   authorities.  A default list of authorities is shipped with the Tor
+   software. Users can change this list, but are encouraged not to do so, in
+   order to avoid partitioning attacks.
 
-   There are multiple directory servers.  Rather than doing anything
-   complicated to coordinate themselves, clients simply rotate through them
-   in order, and only use servers that most of the last several directory
-   servers like.
+   Routers periodically upload signed "descriptors" to the directory
+   authorities describing their keys, capabilities, and other information.
+   Routers may act as directory mirrors (also called "caches"), to reduce
+   load on the directory authorities.  They announce this in their
+   descriptors.
 
-2. Router descriptors
+   Each directory authorities periodically generates and signs a compact
+   "network status" document that lists that authority's view of the current
+   descriptors and status for known routers, but which does not include the
+   descriptors themselves.
+
+   Directory mirrors download, cache, and re-serve network-status documents
+   to clients.
+
+   Clients, directory mirrors, and directory authorities all use
+   network-status documents to find out when their list of routers is
+   out-of-date.  If it is, they download any missing router descriptors.
+   Clients download missing descriptors from mirrors; mirrors and authorities
+   download from authorities.  Descriptors are downloaded by the hash of the
+   descriptor, not by the server's identity key: this prevents servers from
+   attacking clients by giving them descriptors nobody else uses.
+
+   All directory information is uploaded and downloaded with HTTP.
+
+   Coordination among directory authorities is done client-side: clients
+   compute a vote-like algorithm among the network-status documents they
+   have, and base their decisions on the result.
+
+1.1. What's different from 0.1.0.x?
+
+   Clients used to download a signed concatenated set of router descriptors
+   (called a "directory") from directory mirrors, regardless of which
+   descriptors had changed.
+
+   Between downloading directories, clients would download "network-status"
+   documents that would list which servers were supposed to running.
+
+   Clients would always believe the most recently published network-status
+   document they were served.
+
+   Routers used to upload fresh descriptors all the time, whether their keys
+   and other information had changed or not.
+
+2. Router operation
 
    The router descriptor format is unchanged from tor-spec.txt.
 
@@ -55,48 +94,56 @@ $Id$
         descriptor was generated, and at least a given interval of time
         (20 mins by default) has passed since then.
 
-      - Uptime has been reset.
+      - Its uptime has been reset (by restarting).
 
    After generating a descriptor, ORs upload it to every directory
-   server they know.
+   authority they know, by posting it to the URL
 
-3. Network status
+      http://<hostname>/tor/
 
-   Directory servers generate, sign, and compress a network-status document
-   as needed.  As an optimization, they may rate-limit the number of such
-   documents generated to once every few seconds.  Directory servers should
-   rate-limit at least to the point where these documents are generated no
-   faster than once per second.
+3. Network status format
+
+   Directory authorities generate, sign, and compress network-status
+   documents.  Directory servers SHOULD generate a fresh network-status
+   document when the contents of such a document would be different from the
+   last one generated, and some time (at least one second, possibly longer)
+   has passed since the last one was generated.
 
    The network status document contains a preamble, a set of router status
    entries, and a signature, in that order.
 
    We use the same meta-format as used for directories and router descriptors
-   in "tor-spec.txt".
+   in "tor-spec.txt".  Impkementations Implementations MAY insert blank lines
+   for clarity between sections; these blank lines are ignored.
+   Implementations MUST NOT depend on blank lines in any particular location.
 
    The preamble contains:
 
       "network-status-version" -- A document format version.  For this
          specification, the version is "2".
-      "dir-source" -- The hostname, current IP address, and directory
-         port of the directory server, separated by spaces.
+      "dir-source" -- The authority's hostname, current IP address, and
+         directory port, all separated by spaces.
       "fingerprint" -- A base16-encoded hash of the signing key's
          fingerprint, with no additional spaces added.
       "contact" -- An arbitrary string describing how to contact the
          directory server's administrator.  Administrators should include at
          least an email address and a PGP fingerprint.
       "dir-signing-key" -- The directory server's public signing key.
-      "client-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended client versions.
-      "server-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended server versions.
+      "client-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended client
+        versions.
+      "server-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended server
+        versions.
       "published" -- The publication time for this network-status object.
       "dir-options" -- A set of flags separated by spaces:
-          "Names" if this directory server performs name bindings.
-          "Versions" if this directory server recommends software versions.
+          "Names" if this directory authority performs name bindings.
+          "Versions" if this directory authority recommends software versions.
 
    The dir-options entry is optional.  The "-versions" entries are required if
    the "Versions" flag is present.  The other entries are required and must
    appear exactly once. The "network-status-version" entry must appear first;
-   the others may appear in any order.
+   the others may appear in any order.  Implementations MUST ignore
+   additional arguments to the items above, and MUST ignore unrecognized
+   flags.
 
    For each router, the router entry contains:  (This format is designed for
    conciseness.)
@@ -108,35 +155,38 @@ $Id$
           - A hash of its most recent descriptor, encoded in base64, with
             trailing = signs removed.  (The hash is calculated as for
             computing the signature of a descriptor.)
-          - The publication time of its most recent descriptor.
-          - An IP
+          - The publication time of its most recent descriptor, in the form
+            YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS, in GMT.
+          - An IP address
           - An OR port
           - A directory port (or "0" for none")
       "s" -- A series of space-separated status flags:
+          "Authority" if the router is a directory authority.
           "Exit" if the router is useful for building general-purpose exit
              circuits.
-          "Stable" if the router tends to stay up for a long time.
           "Fast" if the router has high bandwidth.
+          "Named" if the router's identity-nickname mapping is canonical,
+             and this authority binds names.
+          "Stable" if the router tends to stay up for a long time.
           "Running" if the router is currently usable.
-          "Named" if the router's identity-nickname mapping is canonical.
           "Valid" if the router has been 'validated'.
-          "Authority" if the router is a directory authority.
+          "V2Dir" if the router implements this protocol.
 
       The "r" entry for each router must appear first and is required.  The
-      's" entry is optional.  Unrecognized flags, or extra elements on the
+      's" entry is optional.  Unrecognized flags and extra elements on the
       "r" line must be ignored.
 
    The signature section contains:
 
       "directory-signature". A signature of the rest of the document using
-      the directory server's signing key.
+      the directory authority's signing key.
 
    We compress the network status list with zlib before transmitting it.
 
-4. Directory server operation
+3.1. Establishing server status
 
-   By default, directory servers remember all non-expired, non-superseded OR
-   descriptors that they have seen.
+   [[XXXXX Describe how authorities actually decide Fast, Named, Stable,
+   Running, Valid
 
    For each OR, a directory server remembers whether the OR was running and
    functional the last time they tried to connect to it, and possibly other
@@ -156,19 +206,99 @@ $Id$
    other directory servers (name X is bound to identity Y if at least one
    binding directory lists it, and no directory binds X to some other Y'.)
 
+   ]]
+
+4. Directory server operation
+
+   All directory authorities and directory mirrors ("directory servers")
+   implement this section, except as noted.
+
+4.1. Accepting uploads (authorities only)
+
+   When a router posts a signed descriptor to a directory authority, the
+   authority first checks whether it is well-formed and correctly
+   self-signed.  If it is, the authority next verifies that the nickname
+   question is already assigned to a router with a different public key.
+   Finally, the authority MAY check that the router is not blacklisted
+   because of its key, IP, or another reason.
+
+   If the descriptor passes these tests, and the authority does not already
+   have a descriptor for a router with this public key, it accepts the
+   descriptor and remembers it.
+
+   If the authority _does_ have a descriptor with the same public key, the
+   newly uploaded descriptor is remembered if its publication time is more
+   recent than the most recent old descriptor for that router, and either:
+      - There are non-cosmetic differences between the old descriptor and the
+        new one.
+      - Enough time has passed between the descriptors' publication times.
+        (Currently, 12 hours.)
+
+   Differences between router descriptors are "non-cosmetic" if they would be
+   sufficient to force an upload as described in section 2 above.
+
+   Note that the "cosmetic difference" test only applies to uploaded
+   descriptors, not to descriptors that the authority downloads from other
+   authorities.
+
+4.2. Downloading network-status documents
+
+   All directory servers (authorities and mirrors) try to keep a fresh set of
+   network-status documents from every authority.  To do so, every 5 minutes,
+   an authority asks every other authority for its most recent network-status
+   document.  Every 15 minutes, a mirror picks a random authority and asks it
+   for the most recent network-status documents for all the authorities it
+   knows about (including the chosen authority itself).
+
+   [XXXX Should mirrors just do what authorities do?  Should they do it at
+   the same interval?]
+
+   Directory servers and mirrors remember and serve the most recent
+   network-status document they have from each authority.  Other
+   network-status don't need to be stored.  If the most recent network-status
+   document is over 10 days old, it is discarded anyway.
+
+4.3. Downloading and storing router descriptors
+
+   Periodically (currently, every 10 seconds), directory servers check
+   whether there are any specific descriptors (as identified by descriptor
+   hash in a network-status document) that they do not have and that they
+   are not currently trying to download.
+
+   If so, the directory server launches requests to the authorities for these
+   descriptors, such that each authority is only asked for descriptors listed
+   in its most recent network-status.  When more than one authority lists the
+   descriptor, we choose which to ask at random.
+
+   If one of these downloads fails, we do not try to download that descriptor
+   from the authority that failed to serve it again unless we receive a newer
+   network-status from that authority that lists the same descriptor.
+
+   Directory servers must potentially cache multiple descriptors for each
+   router. Servers must not discard any descriptor listed by any current
+   network-status document from any authority.  If there is enough space to
+   store additional descriptors [XXXXXX then how do we pick.]
+
+   Authorities SHOULD NOT download descriptors for routers that they would
+   immediately reject for reasons listed in 3.1.
+
+4.4. HTTP URLs
+
+   "Fingerprints" in these URLs are base-16-encoded SHA1 hashes.
+
    The authoritative network-status published by a host should be available at:
       http://<hostname>/tor/status/authority.z
 
-   An authoritative network-status published by another host with fingerprint
+   The network-status published by a host with fingerprint
    <F> should be available at:
       http://<hostname>/tor/status/fp/<F>.z
 
-   An authoritative network-status published by other hosts with fingerprints
+   The network-status documents published by hosts with fingerprints
    <F1>,<F2>,<F3> should be available at:
       http://<hostname>/tor/status/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>.z
 
-   The most recent network-status documents from all known authoritative
-   directories, concatenated, should be available at:
+   The most recent network-status documents from all known authorities,
+   concatenated, should be available at:
          http://<hostname>/tor/status/all.z
 
    The most recent descriptor for a server whose identity key has a
@@ -194,7 +324,7 @@ $Id$
    should be available at:
       http://<hostname>/tor/server/all.z
 
-   For debugging, directories MAY expose non-compressed objects at URLs like
+   For debugging, directories SHOULD expose non-compressed objects at URLs like
    the above, but without the final ".z".
 
    Clients MUST handle compressed concatenated information in two forms:
@@ -203,193 +333,169 @@ $Id$
    Directory servers MAY generate either format: the former requires less
    CPU, but the latter requires less bandwidth.
 
-4.1. Caching
-
-   Directory caches (most ORs) regularly download network status documents,
-   and republish them at a URL based on the directory server's identity key:
-      http://<hostname>/tor/status/<identity fingerprint>.z
-
-   A concatenated list of all network-status documents should be available at:
-      http://<hostname>/tor/status/all.z
-
-4.2. Compression
-
-
-5. Client operation
-
-   Every OP or OR, including directory servers, acts as a client to the
-   directory protocol.
-
-   Each client maintains a list of trusted directory servers.  Periodically
-   (currently every 20 minutes), the client downloads a new network status. It
-   chooses the directory server from which its current information is most
-   out-of-date, and retries on failure until it finds a running server.
-
-   When choosing ORs to build circuits, clients proceed as follows:
-     - A server is "listed" if it is listed by more than half of the "live"
-       network status documents the clients have downloaded.  (A network
-       status is "live" if it is the most recently downloaded network status
-       document for a given directory server, and the server is a directory
-       server trusted by the client, and the network-status document is no
-       more than D (say, 10) days old.)
-     - A server is "valid" is it is listed as valid by more than half of the
-       "live" downloaded" network-status document.
-     - A server is "running" if it is listed as running by more than
-       half of the "recent" downloaded network-status documents.
-       (A network status is "recent" if it was published in the last
-       60 minutes.  If there are fewer than 3 such documents, the most
-       recently published 3 are "recent."  If there are fewer than 3 in all,
-       all are "recent.")
-
-
-   Clients store network status documents so long as they are live.
+5. Client operation: downloading information
 
-5.1. Scheduling network status downloads
+   Every Tor that is not a directory server (that is, clients and ORs that do
+   not have a DirPort set) implements this section.
 
-   This download scheduling algorithm implements the approach described above
-   in a relatively low-state fashion.  It reflects the current Tor
-   implementation.
+5.1. Downloading network-status documents
 
-   Clients maintain a list of authorities; each client tries to keep the same
-   list, in the same order.
+   Each client maintains an ordered list of directory authorities.
+   Insofar as possible, clients SHOULD all use the same ordered list.
 
-   Periodically, on startup, and on HUP, clients check whether they need to
-   download fresh network status documents.  The approach is as follows:
-     - If we have under X network status documents newer than OLD, we choose a
-       member of the list at random and try download XX documents starting
-       with that member's.
-     - Otherwise, if we have no network status documents newer than NEW, we
-       check to see which authority's document we retrieved most recently,
-       and try to retrieve the next authority's document.  If we can't, we
-       try the next authority in sequence, and so on.
+   Client check whether they have enough recently published network-status
+   documents (currently, this means that they must have a network-status
+   published within the last 48 hours for over half of the authorities).
+   If they do not, they download enough network-status documents so that this
+   is so.
 
-5.2. Managing naming
+   Also, if the most recently published network-status document is over 30
+   minutes old, the client downloads a network-status document.
 
-   In order to provide human-memorable names for individual server
-   identities, some directory servers bind names to IDs.  Clients handle
-   names in two ways:
+   When choosing which documents to download, clients treat their list of
+   directory authorities as a circular ring, and begin with the authority
+   appearing immediately after the authority for their most recently
+   published network-status document.
 
-   If a client is encountering a name it has not mapped before:
+   If enough mirrors (currently 4) claim not to have a given network status,
+   we stop trying to download that authority's network-status, until we
+   download a new network-status that makes us believe that the authority in
+   question is running.
 
-      If all the "binding" networks-status documents the client has so far
-      received same claim that the name binds to some identity X, and the
-      client has received at least three network-status documents, the client
-      maps the name to X.
+   Network-status documents published over 10 hours in the past are
+   discarded.
 
-   If a client is encountering a name it has mapped before:
+5.2. Downloading router descriptors
 
-      It uses the last-mapped identity value, unless all of the "binding"
-      network status documents bind the name to some other identity.
+   Clients try to have the best descriptor for each router.  A descriptor is
+   "best" if:
+      * it the most recently published descriptor listed for that router by
+        at least two network-status documents.
+      * OR, no descriptor for that router is listed by two or more
+        network-status documents, and it is the most recently published
+        descriptor listed by any network-status document.
 
-5.3. Notes on what we do now.
+   Periodically (currently every 10 seconds) clients check whether there are
+   any "downloadable" descriptors.  A descriptor is downloadable if:
+      - It is the "best" descriptor for some router.
+      - The descriptor was published at least 5 minutes (???) in the past.
+        [This prevents clients from trying to fetch descriptors that the
+        mirrors have not yet retrieved and cached.]
+      - The client does not currently have it.
+      - The client is not currently trying to download it.
 
-   THIS SECTION SHOULD BE FOLDED INTO THE EARLIER SECTIONS; THEY ARE WRONG;
-   THIS IS RIGHT.
+   If at least 1/16 of known routers have downloadable descriptors, or if
+   enough time (currently 10 minutes) has passed since the last time the
+   client tried to download descriptors, it launches requests for all
+   downloadable descriptors, as described in 5.3 below.
 
-   All downloaded networkstatuses are discarded once they are 10 days old (by
-   published date).
+   When a descriptor download fails, the client notes it, and does not
+   consider the descriptor downloadable again until a certain amount of time
+   has passed. (Currently 0 seconds for the first failure, 60 seconds for the
+   second, 5 minutes for the third, 10 minutes for the fourth, and 1 day
+   thereafter.)  Periodically (currently once an hour) clients reset the
+   failure count.
 
-   Authdirs download each others' networkstatus every
-   AUTHORITY_NS_CACHE_INTERVAL minutes (currently 10).
+   No descriptors are downloaded until the client has downloaded more than
+   half of the network-status documents.
 
-   Directory caches download authorities' networkstatus every
-   NONAUTHORITY_NS_CACHE_INTERVAL minutes (currently 10).
+5.3. Managing downloads
 
-   Clients always try to replace any networkstatus received over
-   NETWORKSTATUS_MAX_VALIDITY ago (currently 2 days). Also, when the most
-   recently received networkstatus is more than
-   NETWORKSTATUS_CLIENT_DL_INTERVAL (30 minutes) old, and we do not have any
-   open directory connections fetching a networkstatus, clients try to
-   download the networkstatus on their list after the most recently received
-   networkstatus, skipping failed networkstatuses.  A networkstatus is
-   "failed" if NETWORKSTATUS_N_ALLOWABLE_FAILURES (3) attempts in a row have
-   all failed.
+   When a client has no live network-status documents, it downloads
+   network-status documents from a randomly chosen authority.  In all other
+   cases, the client downloads from mirrors randomly chosen from among those
+   believed to be V2 directory servers.  (This information comes from the
+   network-status documents; see 6 below.)
 
-   We do not update router statuses if we have less than half of the
-   networkstatuses.
+   When downloading multiple router descriptors, the client chooses multiple
+   mirrors so that:
+     - At least 3 different mirrors are used, except when this would result
+       in more than one request for under 4 descriptors.
+     - No more than 128 descriptors are requested from a single mirror.
+     - Otherwise, as few mirrors as possible are used.
+   After choosing mirrors, the client divides the descriptors among them
+   randomly.
 
-   A networkstatus is "live" if it is the most recent we have received signed
-   by a given trusted authority.
+   After receiving any response client MUST reject any network-status
+   documents and descriptors that it did not request.
 
-   A networkstatus is "recent" if it is "live" and:
-       - it was received in the last DEFAULT_RUNNING_INTERVAL (currently 60
-         minutes)
-   OR  - it was one of the MIN_TO_INFLUENCE_RUNNING (3) most recently received
-         networkstatuses.
+6. Using directory information
 
-   Authorities always believe their own opinion as to a router's status.  For
-   other tors:
-     - a router is valid if more than half of the live networkstatuses think
-       it's valid.
-     - a router is named if more than half of the live networkstatuses from
-       naming authorities think it's named, and they all think it has the
-       same name.
-     - a router is running if more than half of the recent networkstatuses
-       think it's running.
+   Everyone besides directory authorities uses the approaches in this section
+   to decide which servers to use and what their keys are likely to be.
+   (Directory authorities just believe their own opinions, as in 3.1 above.)
 
-   Everyone downloads router descriptors as follows:
+6.1. Choosing routers for circuits.
 
-     - If any networkstatus lists a more recently published routerdesc with a
-       different descriptor digest, and no more than
-       MAX_ROUTERDESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES attempts to retrieve that routerdesc
-       have failed, then that routerdesc is "downloadable".
+   Tor implementations only pay attention to "live" network-status documents.
+   A network status is "live" if it is the most recently downloaded network
+   status document for a given directory server, and the server is a
+   directory server trusted by the client, and the network-status document is
+   no more than 2 days old.
 
-     - Every DirFetchInterval, or whenever a request for routerdescs returns
-       no routerdescs, we launch a set of requests for all downloadable
-       routerdescs.  We divide the downloadable routerdescs into groups of no
-       more than DL_PER_REQUEST, and send a request for each group to
-       directory servers chosen independently.
+   For time-sensitive information, Tor implementations focus on "recent"
+   network-status documents.  A network status is "recent" if it is live, and
+   if it was published in the last 60 minutes.  If there are fewer than fewer
+   than 3 such documents, the most recently published 3 are "recent."  If
+   there are fewer than 3 in all, all are "recent.")
 
-     - We also launch a request as above when a request for routerdescs
-       fails and we have no directory connections fetching routerdescs.
+   No circuits must be built until the client has enough directory
+   information: at least two live network-status documents, and descriptors
+   for at least 1/4 of the servers believed to be running.
 
-   TODO Specify here:
-    - When to 0-out failure count for networkstatus?
+   A server is "listed" if it is included by more than half of the live
+   network status documents.  Clients SHOULD NOT use unlisted servers.
 
-    - Drop fallback to download-all.  Also, always split download.
+   A server is "valid" if it is listed as valid by more than half of the live
+   network-status documents.  Clients SHOULD NOT non-valid servers unless
+   specifically configured to do so.
 
-    - For versions: if you're listed by more than half of live versioning
-      networkstatuses, good.  if less than half of networkstatuses are live,
-      don't do anything.  If half are live, and half of less of the
-      versioning ones list you, warn.  Only warn once every 24 hours.
+   A server is "running" if it is listed as running by more than half of the
+   recent network-status documents.  Clients SHOULD NOT try to use
+   non-running servers.
 
-    - For names: warn if an unnamed router is specified by nickname.
-      Rate-limit these warnings.
-      - Also, don't believe N->K if another naming authdir says N->K'.
-      - Revise naming rule: N->K is true if any naming directory says N->K,
-        and no other naming directory says N->K' or N'->K.
+   A server is believed to be a directory mirror if it is listed as a V2
+   directory by more than half of the recent network-status documents.
 
-    - Minimum info to build circuits.
+6.1. Managing naming
 
-    - Revise: always split requests when we have too little info to build
-      circuits.
+   In order to provide human-memorable names for individual server
+   identities, some directory servers bind names to IDs.  Clients handle
+   names in two ways:
 
-    - Describe when router is "out of date".  (Any dirserver says so.)
+   When a client encountering a name it has not mapped before:
 
-    - Change rule from "do not launch new connections when one exists" to
-      "do not request any fingerprint that we're currently requesting."
+      If all the live "Naming" networks-status documents the client has
+      receive that the name binds to some identity ID, and the client has at
+      least three live network-status documents, the client maps the name to
+      ID.
 
-    - Launch new connections every minute, plus whenever a download fails.
-    - Reset routerdesc failure count after 60 minutes, or when
-      when network comes back on after absence.
-    - Make "I didn't get the one I thought was most recent" a failure.
-      - Retry these every 5 minutes if you're a client.
-      - Mirrors should retry these harder and more often.
-    - If we have a routerdesc for Bob, and he says, "I'm 0.1.0.x", don't
-      fetch a new one if it was published in the last 2 hours. (??)
+   If a client is encountering a name it has mapped before:
 
-    - Describe what we do with old server versions.
+      It uses the last-mapped identity value, unless all of the "Naming"
+      network status documents that list the name bind it to some other
+      identity.
 
-    - If we have less than 16 to download, do not download unless 10 minutes
-      have passed since last download.
+   When a user tries to refer to a router with a name that does not have a
+   mapping under the above rules, the implementation SHOULD warn the user.
+   After giving the warning, the implementation MAY use a router that at
+   least one Naming authority maps the name to, so long as no other naming
+   authority maps that name to a different router.
 
-    - Which descriptors do directory servers remember?
+6.2. Software versions
 
-6. Remaining issues
+   Implementations of Tor SHOULD warn when it has live network-statuses from
+   more than half of the authorities, and it is running a software version
+   not listed on more than half of the live "Versioning" network-status
+   documents.
 
-   Client-knowledge partitioning is worrisome.  Most versions of this don't
-   seem to be worse than the Danezis-Murdoch tracing attack, since an
-   attacker can't do more than deduce probable exits from entries (or vice
-   versa).  But what about when the client connects to A and B but in a
-   different order?  How bad can it be partitioned based on its knowledge?
+TODO:
+    - Resolve XXXXs
+    - Are the magic numbers above sane?
 
+    - Client-knowledge partitioning is worrisome.  Most versions of this
+      don't seem to be worse than the Danezis-Murdoch tracing attack, since
+      an attacker can't do more than deduce probable exits from entries (or
+      vice versa).  But what about when the client connects to A and B but in
+      a different order?  How bad can it be partitioned based on its
+      knowledge?



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