[or-cvs] a todo list for 0.0.8
arma at seul.org
Sun Aug 15 08:25:51 UTC 2004
Update of /home2/or/cvsroot/doc
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv29738
a todo list for 0.0.8
RCS file: /home2/or/cvsroot/doc/TODO,v
retrieving revision 1.147
retrieving revision 1.148
diff -u -d -r1.147 -r1.148
--- TODO 10 Aug 2004 00:20:44 -0000 1.147
+++ TODO 15 Aug 2004 08:25:48 -0000 1.148
@@ -11,50 +11,95 @@
- bug fixes, necessary:
- - Why is the first entry of kill -USR1 a router with a 0 key?
- - why does common/util.c build-depend on or/or.h ?
+NICK - Why is the first entry of kill -USR1 a router with a 0 key?
+NICK - why does common/util.c build-depend on or/or.h ?
+NICK? - Tors deal appropriately when a newly-verified router has the
+ same nickname as another router they know about
+NICK? - Add '[...truncated]' or similar to truncated log entries (like the directory
+ in connection_dir_process_inbuf()).
+NICK? - put ip:port:keyhash in intro points, rendezvous points,
+ and hidserv descriptors.
+* implement parsing and stuff, but don't switch over the cells until
+ sometime in the future.
+NICK - unify similar config entries that need to be split. put them
+ into a smartlist, and have things take a smartlist.
+ o if a begin failed due to exit policy, but we believe the IP
+ should have been allowed, switch that router to exitpolicy
+ reject *:* until we get our next directory.
+ o tor-resolve needs a man page
+ - "AllowUnverifiedRouters" config option
+NICK - Parse it into 3 bits
+ARMA - Consider it when picking nodes for your path
+ARMA - if there's only one entrynode preference and multiple exit node
+ choices, don't pick the desired entrynode as exit.
+ o 'fascistfirewall' option to pick dirservers on port 80 and
+ ORs on port 443.
+NICK - extend it to take a range of ports
+ARMA - don't replace options->Address with the resolved one at startup.
+ keep the old one and also have a new one.
+ARMA - detect our address right before we make a routerinfo each time?
+ARMA - external IP vs bind-IP
+NICK - parse uptime into router->uptime
+ o clients choose nodes proportional to advertised bandwidth
+ o and/or while avoiding unreliable nodes, depending on goals
+ - figure out what to do when somebody asks to extend to
+* reject it. assuming this is as dumb as it sounds.
+ - make loglevel info less noisy
+ - defining an ORPort isn't necessary anymore, if you use
+ ORAddress:port. Same with DirPort, SocksPort.
+* fix is-a-server macro to look at *bindaddress too.
bug fixes, might be handy:
+ - the directory servers complain a lot about people using the
+ old key. does 0.0.7 use dirservers before it's pulled down
+ the directory?
- put expiry date on onion-key, so people don't keep trying
old ones that they could know are expired?
+* Leave on todo list, see if pre3 onion fixes helped enough.
- should the running-routers list put unverified routers at the
+* Cosmetic, don't do it yet.
- make advertised_server_mode() ORs fetch dirs more often.
- - if a begin failed due to exit policy, but we believe the IP
- should have been allowed, switch that router to exitpolicy
- reject *:* until we get our next directory.
- - Tors deal appropriately when a newly-verified router has the
- same nickname as another router they know about
+* not necessary yet.
+ - Add a notion of nickname->Pubkey binding that's not 'verification'
+* eventually, only when needed
- ORs use uniquer default nicknames
+* Don't worry about this for now
- Handle full buffers without totally borking
- - Add '[...truncated]' or similar to truncated log entries (like the directory
- in connection_dir_process_inbuf()).
- protocol changes and design work:
- - put ip:port in intro points, rendezvous points, and hidserv
- - figure out what to do when somebody asks to extend to
+* do this eventually, no rush.
more features, easy:
- check the date in the http headers, compare for clock skew.
+* nick should do this
- requiredentrynode vs preferredentrynode
+* nick can do this, and will figure out what it should be called
- per-month byte allowances
- - tor-resolve needs a man page
- - "AllowUnverifiedRouters" config option
- - Parse it into a bitvector
- - Consider it when picking nodes for your path
+* nick will spec something.
- have a pool of circuits available, cannibalize them
for your purposes (e.g. rendezvous, etc).
+* hold off on that.
+ - node 'groups' that are known to be in the same zone of control
+* nick and roger will talk about it
+ - do resolve before trying to attach the stream
+* don't do this for now.
+ - if destination IP is running a tor node, extend a circuit there
+ before sending begin.
+* don't do this for now. figure out how enclaves work. but do enclaves soon.
more features, complex:
- - defining an ORPort isn't necessary anymore, if you use
- ORAddress:port. Same with DirPort, SocksPort.
- compress the directory. client sends http header
"accept-transfer-encoding: gzip", server might send http header
"transfer-encoding: gzip". ta-da.
- grow a zlib dependency. keep a cached compressed directory.
+* nick will look into this. not critical priority.
- Switch dirservers entries to config lines:
- read in and parse each TrustedDir config line.
- stop reading dirservers file.
@@ -67,15 +112,19 @@
options.TrustedDirs, and make sure there's a descriptor
with that nickname, whose key hashes to the fingerprint,
and who correctly signed the directory.
+* nick will do the above
- when fetching a directory, if you want a trusted one,
choose from the trusteddir list.
- which means keeping track of which ones are "up"
- if you don't need a trusted one, choose from the routerinfo
list if you have one, else from the trusteddir list.
+* roger will do the above
- add a listener for a ui
+* nick chats with weasel
- and a basic gui
- Have clients and dirservers preserve reputation info over
+* continue not doing until we have something we need to preserve
- users can set their bandwidth, or we auto-detect it:
- advertised bandwidth defaults to 10KB
o advertised bandwidth is the min of max seen in each direction
@@ -90,11 +139,12 @@
- start counting again if your IP ever changes.
- never regenerate identity keys, for now.
- you can set a bit for not-being-an-OR.
- - clients choose nodes proportional to advertised bandwidth
+* no need to do this yet. few people define their ORPort.
- authdirserver lists you as running iff:
- he can connect to you
- he has successfully extended to you
- you have sufficient mean-time-between-failures
+* keep doing nothing for now.
- Possible to get autoconf to easily install things into ~/.tor?
@@ -103,6 +153,7 @@
. rename/rearrange functions for what file they're in
- generalize our transport: add transport.c in preparation for
http, airhook, etc transport.
+NICK - investigate sctp for alternate transport.
NICK . Windows port
@@ -117,28 +168,39 @@
- - FAQ
+ . FAQ
o overview of tor. how does it work, what's it do, pros and
cons of using it, why should I use it, etc.
- a howto tutorial with examples
+* put a stub on the wiki
o tutorial: how to set up your own tor network
- (need to not hardcode dirservers file in config.c)
+* this will be solved when we put dirservers in config lines
+ - port forwarding howto for ipchains, etc
+* roger add to wiki of requests
. correct, update, polish spec
- document the exposed function api?
o document what we mean by socks.
NICK . packages
+* nick will look at the spec file
- find a long-term rpm maintainer
+* roger will start guilting people
- better warn/info messages
o let tor do resolves.
o extend socks4 to do resolves?
o make script to ask tor for resolves
+ - write howto for setting up tsocks, socat.
+ - including on osx and win32
+ - freecap handling
o gather patches, submit to maintainer
+* send him a reminder mail and see what's up.
- intercept gethostbyname and others
+* add this to tsocks
o do resolve via tor
- redesign and thorough code revamp, with particular eye toward:
- support half-open tcp connections
@@ -152,6 +214,7 @@
that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
- tie into squid
- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
+* figure out what breaks for this, and do it.
- when the client fails to pick an intro point for a hidserv,
it should refetch the hidserv desc.
. should maybe make clients exit(1) when bad things happen?
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