[or-cvs] (FWD) Fix minor typos and add a cite for Privoxy

[Roger Dingledine]

----- Forwarded message from owner-or-cvs at freehaven.net -----

To: or-cvs at freehaven.net
Subject: Fix minor typos and add a cite for Privoxy
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2003 21:21:54 -0500 (EST)
From: weasel at seul.org (Peter Palfrader)

Update of /home/or/cvsroot/doc
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/weasel/cvs-or/doc

Modified Files:
	tor-design.bib tor-design.tex 
Log Message:
Fix minor typos and add a cite for Privoxy

Index: tor-design.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/doc/tor-design.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.11
retrieving revision 1.12
diff -u -d -r1.11 -r1.12
--- tor-design.bib	28 Oct 2003 21:55:38 -0000	1.11
+++ tor-design.bib	30 Oct 2003 02:21:51 -0000	1.12
@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@
 @Misc{anonymizer,
   key =          {anonymizer},
   title =        {The {Anonymizer}},
-  note =         {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com}}
+  note =         {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com/}}
+}
+
+ at Misc{privoxy,
+  key =          {privoxy},
+  title =        {{Privoxy}},
+  note =         {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}}
 }
 
 @Misc{anonnet,

Index: tor-design.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/doc/tor-design.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.35
retrieving revision 1.36
diff -u -d -r1.35 -r1.36
--- tor-design.tex	30 Oct 2003 00:24:53 -0000	1.35
+++ tor-design.tex	30 Oct 2003 02:21:51 -0000	1.36
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 \cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based
 programs without modification.  This design change allows Tor to
 use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing
-application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to
+application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to
 incorporate those features itself.
 
 \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
 
 Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt
 to anonymize interactive network traffic.  Because these protocols typically
-involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is
+involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
 difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
 interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume
 of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it.  These
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
 appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an
 intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate
 initiator, or just another intermediary.  Crowds uses no public-key
-encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
+encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
 nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on
 filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only
 supports HTTP traffic.
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
   % the enclave-firewall model? -RD
   % I don't think we should. -NM
 \item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol
-  normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer.  In order to make clients
+  normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer.  In order to make clients
   indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP,
   Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide
   differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity,


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