[or-cvs] Be smarter about getting key matter from DH.

[Nick Mathewson]

Update of /home/or/cvsroot/src/or
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv27166/src/or

Modified Files:
	test.c 
Log Message:
Be smarter about getting key matter from DH.

Formerly, once we had g^xy, we took the last N bytes from g^xy.

Now, we take SHA(g^xy || [0]) || SHA1(g^xy || [1]) || ... , in order
to use all bits from g^xy equally, and generate as much key material
as we need.



Index: test.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/src/or/test.c,v
retrieving revision 1.29
retrieving revision 1.30
diff -u -d -r1.29 -r1.30
--- test.c	30 Jun 2003 19:18:32 -0000	1.29
+++ test.c	30 Jul 2003 19:10:20 -0000	1.30
@@ -9,6 +9,21 @@
 #include "../common/test.h"
 
 void
+dump_hex(char *s, int len)
+{
+  static const char TABLE[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+  unsigned char *d = s;
+  int i, j, nyb;
+  for(i=0;i<len;++i) {
+    for (j=1;j>=0;--j) {
+      nyb = (((int) d[i]) >> (j*4)) & 0x0f;
+      assert(0<=nyb && nyb <=15);
+      putchar(TABLE[nyb]);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void
 setup_directory() {
   char buf[256];
   sprintf(buf, "/tmp/tor_test");
@@ -178,8 +193,8 @@
   
   memset(s1, 0, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE);
   memset(s2, 0xFF, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE);
-  s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh1, p2, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE, s1);
-  s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh2, p1, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE, s2);
+  s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh1, p2, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE, s1, 50);
+  s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh2, p1, CRYPTO_DH_SIZE, s2, 50);
   test_assert(s1len > 0);
   test_eq(s1len, s2len);
   test_memeq(s1, s2, s1len);
@@ -443,7 +458,6 @@
   
   crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
 
-  /* FIXME sometimes (infrequently) the following fails! Why? */
   if (memcmp(c_keys, s_keys, 40)) {
     puts("Aiiiie");
     exit(1);