[tor-bugs] #34257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Analyze unusual distribution of time to extend to first hop in circuit

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed May 20 20:35:34 UTC 2020


#34257: Analyze unusual distribution of time to extend to first hop in circuit
-------------------------------+--------------------------------
 Reporter:  karsten            |          Owner:  metrics-team
     Type:  defect             |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium             |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal             |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                     |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                     |         Points:
 Reviewer:                     |        Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
-------------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by karsten):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59-must


Comment:

 [[Image(onionperf-circuit-extend-2020-05-20.png, 700px)]]

 Columns in the data file are:
  - date: date when the circuit was built
  - source: OnionPerf instance name
  - quantile: circuit build quantile used by tor
  - timeout: circuit build timeout used by tor
  - server: public or onion server
  - circlen: circuit length
  - fp1: short fingerprint of first hop
  - fp2: short fingerprint of second hop
  - fpn: short fingerprint of last (typically third) hop
  - cw1: consensus weight of first hop
  - cw2: consensus weight of second hop
  - cwn: consensus weight of last hop
  - bt1: build time in milliseconds to extend to first hop
  - bt2: time in milliseconds from extending to first hop to extending to
 second hop
  - btn: time in milliseconds from extending to last but one hop to
 extending to last hop
  - start2req: time in milliseconds from starting measurement to sending
 HTTP GET
  - req2fb: time in milliseconds from sending HTTP GET to receiving first
 response byte

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/34257#comment:1>
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