[tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Mar 24 21:40:30 UTC 2020


#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-       |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #33703                               |         Points:  15
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor27-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:3 vinay]:
 > * MTP 1.2 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.03588.pdf)

 Unfortunately, we only have about 253 bytes max to use if we want to send
 the proof in the intro circuit itself... MTP proofs are ~187KB with their
 recommended L=70 parameter (see Section 4.6). This is far too large to use
 without a secondary validator server that hands out tokens in exchange for
 proofs, which is a lot more complexity :/

 Other potential ideas from the MTP paper's references:
  * https://wwwcn.cs.uni-
 duesseldorf.de/publications/publications/library/Jerschow2010a.pdf
  * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1168.pdf (has a good comparison section at
 the end)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31223#comment:13>
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