[tor-bugs] #32794 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve OOS (out-of-sockets) handler victim selection and more
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Jan 7 02:19:53 UTC 2020
#32794: improve OOS (out-of-sockets) handler victim selection and more
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Reporter: starlight | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.4.2.5
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: nickm | Sponsor:
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Comment (by starlight):
Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
> Is that right? If so, I wonder if there is some way that attacker can
exploit this by making a bunch of directory connections, if our directory
port is open. Maybe we should consider CONN_TYPE_DIR as well.
Good point. I could rework it to sort OR-OR connections to a low priority
band, the rest in a high band without excluding any category except
listeners. Connection age sort within bands. Open to your thoughts on
this.
> I also wonder if the attacker can reduce our number of available sockets
by simply attempting a socket exhaustion attack. We'll kill off some of
their connections, but we won't kill them all. If the attacker preserves
the ones that we don't kill, they will always survive instead of any newer
connections that we receive in the future. Can we do any better than
this?
Have further work where underlying circuits are killed rather than
connections. Do you see that as improving this issue? And dynamic
configuration of the limits for threshold min, max and soft nofiles.
> (Once we're in agreement here, we should describe the algorithm we want
to follow in a patch to tor-spec.txt, so that the correct behavior is
documented.)
sure!
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32794#comment:4>
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