[tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability (was: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string)

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#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability
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 Reporter:  alecmuffett               |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006      |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
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Comment (by sysrqb):

 I spoke with some people at the Mozilla All Hands in Berlin about the idea
 of using [https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-ua-client-hints-00 Client
 Hints] as the signal vector for this. They suggested I open a bugzilla
 ticket about this, so more people are aware (they also didn't think this
 idea was too crazy on first thought). I just added a comment on the
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=935216#c65 Client Hints]
 ticket instead. Mozilla's [https://github.com/mozilla/standards-
 positions/issues/202 position] on it, for those who are curious.

 I am still concerned about (more) websites discriminating against Tor
 users when they are given an unambiguous signal (rather than relying on
 non-trivial queries or incomplete datasets). However, that issue is
 orthogonal to what we can accomplish with this ticket.

 With respect to the concern about advertising this capability in *every*
 request sent by the browser, Client Hints will provide us flexibility in
 when a hint is included. I can see something like: only include `Sec-
 CH-X-Tor: onion` in the initial resource request, or the subsequent
 resource request when following a redirect, and with every fetch/xhr
 requests over a new connection.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32256#comment:25>
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