[tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Feb 20 11:09:18 UTC 2020


#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  project                              |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High                            |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt,        |  Actual Points:
  proposal-needed, censorship, sponsor19, 040    |
  -roadmap-proposed, anti-censorship-roadmap     |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  10
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor28-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by dfiguera):

 > Is it an inbound or outbound firewall?
 The rule to filter the ORPort was applied to ingress.
 The bridge has permission to open outbound connections to any address.

 > Bridges need to accept inbound connections to their ORPort from the
 bridge authority (for its
 > reachability checks), and from other relays (for the bridge's ORPort
 reachability self-treats),
 > and from clients. (So any address on the Internet.)
 A client using a bridge needs to connect to that bridge's ORPort and not
 only to the PT port?

 I was trying to make my bridge a little less vulnerable to detection.
 Thanks for the clarification, I'll keep an eye on tickets related to this
 to see the progress.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7349#comment:50>
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