[tor-bugs] #33325 [Metrics/Onionperf]: O2.3 Implement static guard node support for OnionPerf.

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#33325: O2.3 Implement static guard node support for OnionPerf.
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     Reporter:  gaba               |      Owner:  metrics-team
         Type:  project            |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium             |  Milestone:
    Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal             |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                     |  Parent ID:  #33322
       Points:                     |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                     |
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 Tor clients generally make three-hop circuits (that is, paths that go
 through three relays). The first position in the path called the guard
 node and is always chosen as the first hop for a fixed period of time.
 Using static guard nodes help protect against a certain kind of anonymity-
 breaking attack. The long-running OnionPerf instances that are currently
 deployed do not implement this mitigation because choosing a static guard
 at setup time would heavily influence their measured performance. Instead,
 they’re configured not to choose a guard for each measurement. We want to
 be able to measure the effects of good, bad, or average guards and compare
 the results, which is not possible without the opportunity to select a
 static guard node for an OnionPerf instance. Implementing the option to
 use a static guard in future OnionPerf instances will allow us to measure
 Tor performance closer to how clients experience it.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33325>
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