[tor-bugs] #30941 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Feb 4 20:16:16 UTC 2020


#30941: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  pili                                 |          Owner:  sysrqb
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB               |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, s30-o22a2, anti-            |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-2020Q1                      |
Parent ID:  #31279                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor30
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 phw]:
 > I agree that we need to overhaul the email distribution method. It took
 me a while too, to first figure out how it works, which is bad. Fixing the
 instructions on bridges.torproject.org is something we can do easily. How
 about we change it to the following:
 >
 > > Another way to get bridges is to send an email to
 bridges at torproject.org. Leave the email subject empty and write "get
 bridges" in the email body for normal bridges or "get transport obfs4" for
 an obfuscated bridge. Please note that you must send the email using an
 address from one of the following email providers: Riseup or Gmail.
 [[br]]
 I just deployed this fix as part of #31427. Ticket #17626 is also fixed,
 so what's left is to improve BridgeDB's email instructions. They currently
 say:
 {{{
 Hey, identityfunction! Welcome to BridgeDB!



 COMMANDs: (combine COMMANDs to specify multiple options simultaneously)
   get bridges            Request vanilla bridges.
   get transport [TYPE]   Request a Pluggable Transport by TYPE.
   get help               Displays this message.
   get key                Get a copy of BridgeDB's public GnuPG key.
   get ipv6               Request IPv6 bridges.

 Currently supported transport TYPEs:
   fte
   obfs3
   obfs4
   scramblesuit


 BridgeDB can provide bridges with several types of Pluggable
 Transports[0],
 which can help obfuscate your connections to the Tor Network, making it
 more
 difficult for anyone watching your internet traffic to determine that you
 are
 using Tor.

 Some bridges with IPv6 addresses are also available, though some Pluggable
 Transports aren't IPv6 compatible.

 Additionally, BridgeDB has plenty of plain-ol'-vanilla bridges - without
 any
 Pluggable Transports - which maybe doesn't sound as cool, but they can
 still
 help to circumvent internet censorship in many cases.

 [0]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html

  --
  <3 BridgeDB
 }}}

 I suggest that BridgeDB should respond with obfs4 bridges even if the
 email request is invalid:

 {{{
 Here are your obfs4 bridges:

  obfs4 1.2.3.4:1234 ...
  obfs4 4.3.2.1:4321 ...

 Add these bridges to your Tor Browser by opening your browser
 preferences, clicking on "Tor", and then adding them to the "Provide a
 bridge" field.

 If these bridges are not what you need, respond to this email with one
 of the following commands in the message body:

   get bridges           (Request "vanilla" Tor bridges.)
   get transport TYPE    (Request a different obfuscation type. Replace
                          TYPE with obfs3, obfs4, or scramblesuit.)
   get ipv6              (Request IPv6 bridges.)
 }}}

 What do you think? How can we make it better?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30941#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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