[tor-bugs] #31103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Apr 14 23:29:21 UTC 2020


#31103: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  phw                                  |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1,         |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q2                    |
Parent ID:  #30471                               |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor28-must
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Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:9 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [ticket:31103 phw]:
 > > Bridge operators may welcome a similar option for `ORPort`. However,
 when setting `ORPort` to auto, Tor attempts to find a new port each time
 it starts. This means that operators would have to re-configure their
 firewalls after each restart.
 >
 > By this, do you mean non-PT ("vanilla") bridges? I think there's a
 separate ticket(#7349) for PT bridges to be able to disable their `ORPort`
 to mitigate some bridge confirmation attacks.
 [[br]]
 I mean both vanilla ''and'' obfuscated bridges because both expose an OR
 port (as long as #7349 isn't fixed yet).

 However, if we fix #7349 and obfuscated bridges no longer need an open OR
 port, this ticket becomes less relevant.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31103#comment:11>
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