[tor-bugs] #31804 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Authentication for proxy--bridge connections

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Sep 19 17:02:26 UTC 2019


#31804: Authentication for proxy--bridge connections
-----------------------------------------+--------------------
     Reporter:  cohosh                   |      Owner:  (none)
         Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium                   |  Milestone:
    Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal                   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                           |  Parent ID:
       Points:                           |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:  Sponsor28                |
-----------------------------------------+--------------------
 An DDoS attack surface was brought up in discussion on IRC yesterday (and
 has been talked about to some extent before).

 To summarize the issue:
 The Snowflake bridge accepts websocket connections from any other endpoint
 (this is in part necessary because anyone can be a proxy and we want as
 many proxies as possible and the more ephemeral they are, the harder it is
 for a censor to block all of them)

 This means that an malicious party with the ability to distribute
 malicious javascript can have unsuspecting clients execute javascript that
 makes a websocket connection to the bridge and use the Tor network to
 upgrade their websocket connection to a plain TCP connection.

 This basically allows someone to use Tor in order to perform DDoS attacks
 on TCP services, using malicious javascript as the attack vector. While
 the effectiveness of this attack probably wouldn't be that good (all the
 attack traffic would be congested through the single Snowflake bridge), it
 could provide a way for a censor to more easily DDoS Snowflake itself.

 We could provide some kind of authentication step involving the bridge,
 broker, and snowflake proxy.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31804>
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