[tor-bugs] #31512 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Sep 18 03:30:24 UTC 2019


#31512: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
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 Reporter:  thelamper                 |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Major                     |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:                            |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by thelamper):

 Both of those fingerprinting tests (brax.me/geo/) and (tor.triop.se/) fail
 with javascript disabled ie they cannot generate a 'unique identifying
 number'.

 Does having javascript disabled make it harder to fingerprint individual
 Tor users ie it reduces the data leaked by the user's browser to the
 website in question? The panopticlick and amiunique tests suggest that
 disabling JS helps users blend in with the crowd by reducing their
 uniqueness.

 Or is it generally viewed by the Tor Project as safe (ie non-
 fingerprintable) for Tor users to browse the web with javascript enabled?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31512#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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