[tor-bugs] #29207 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
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Tue Sep 3 18:05:32 UTC 2019
#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
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Reporter: cohosh | Owner: cohosh
Type: enhancement | Status:
| assigned
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Circumvention/Snowflake | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: snowflake, design, ex-sponsor-19, | Actual Points:
anti-censorship-roadmap |
Parent ID: | Points: 5
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor28-must
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:15 dcf]:
> Replying to [comment:13 serna]:
> > I suggest changing the status to 204 No Content, it would represent
that there's no error but it also no one to connect to.
>
> I disagree here. It's better not to hide ''any'' necessary information
in the HTTP layer, because not every way of interacting with the broker
will have those HTTP features. See for example comment:11:ticket:25985.
Even assuming HTTP, codes like 204 are probably less likely to pass
untouched by proxies. I propose to just always use status code 200, unless
there is a genuine internal server error, and encode ''all'' necessary
information in the HTTP body. We're not designing a REST interface here.
Let me slightly amend my statement here. I was mistakenly thinking that
this was about the client–broker protocol, not the proxy–broker protocol.
While I do think that it's important to avoid HTTP entanglement in the
client–broker protocol (#29293), in the proxy–broker protocol there's
probably no harm in assuming HTTP in the proxy–broker protocol. That said,
there's also no harm in moving that information into the body, as in
comment:20.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29207#comment:21>
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