[tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Nov 13 23:11:16 UTC 2019


#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---------------------------+--------------------------------
 Reporter:  phw            |          Owner:  phw
     Type:  defect         |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium         |      Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal         |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3      |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280         |         Points:  10
 Reviewer:                 |        Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  (none) => phw
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 cohosh]:
 > Just took a look, and it looks great so far. The code is well written
 and the design makes sense to me.
 [[br]]
 Thanks for your review.
 [[br]]
 > I'm still doubtful that we'd need or want to expose the API to the
 public. I can see some value in allowing operators to use the web
 interface as a self-check after they set up the bridge, but I'm curious
 about how much use it will get. Do you have any insights into this from
 setting up #30472 before the bridge campaign?
 [[br]]
 We don't have any numbers because our port test tool is run over systemd
 and nobody has figured out how systemd can take the tool's logs (which are
 written to stderr) and log it somewhere else.

 I agree that the primary purpose of this tool is to assist BridgeDB. I'm
 not married to the idea of exposing it to bridge operators but there's a
 clear need for operators to know if their bridge works. If BridgeDB tests
 new bridges and somehow communicates the result to metrics, operators can
 consult our relay search tool to get their answer.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31874#comment:6>
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