[tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--------------------------------------+----------------------------
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein           |          Owner:  JeremyRand
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                            |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
--------------------------------------+----------------------------

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin (commit hash
 `20c7d142948cad98193b50ec6ad75fc272421f1a`).  Here's the summary of the
 current status:

 1. Namecoin is enabled only in Nightly.
 2. Namecoin is enabled only if the environment variable
 `TOR_ENABLE_NAMECOIN=1` is set when Tor Browser is executed.  (At Georg's
 suggestion, I intend to transition this to using a Firefox pref in the
 future.)
 3. Namecoin is enabled only on GNU/Linux targets.  (I intend to add
 Windows, macOS, and Android/Linux support later.)
 4. Namecoin will only work if Python 3.6 or higher is installed.  Python
 3.6 is pretty common nowadays, so this shouldn't be a huge barrier to
 testing it, although it's not ideal.  (In the future, we could look at
 including a Python interpreter binary in the Tor Browser package, thus
 removing this requirement.  Doing so would presumably be needed on Windows
 anyway.)
 5. Stream isolation is supported in this patch, but is dependent on
 #19859.  Until #19859 is merged, this patch will still connect without
 errors, but stream isolation will not be functional, which has two
 implications: degraded privacy and degraded performance.  It should be
 possible to review both patches in parallel, and it should be easy to
 build this patch before #19859 is merged by manually setting the `tor`
 project's Git repo/commit to use the one provided in #19859.  However,
 while I encourage review of this patch, I do not recommend merging this
 patch until #19859 is merged.
 6. 2 of the public ElectrumX Namecoin servers are currently down for
 maintenance.  Since Namecoin connects to multiple servers simultaneously
 to improve performance, the performance of this patch will be degraded
 until those servers come back online.  It still works fine and isn't
 particularly annoying, but there *will* be some higher-than-typical
 latency while we're waiting for those servers to come back online.  (It
 would be awesome if the Tor community decides to set up some additional
 ElectrumX Namecoin servers.)
 7. The 4 domain names that I demoed in Stockholm are
 http://federalistpapers.bit, http://onionshare.bit,
 http://riseuptools.bit, and http://submit.theintercept.bit.  You can use
 either `.bit` or `.bit.onion` eTLD.  (The difference between the two
 eTLD's was covered in the Namecoin session in Stockholm.)
 8. Currently `.bit` domains can only point to a `.onion` domain.  `.bit`
 domains that point to an A, AAAA, CNAME, or other DNS record will not
 resolve.  Adding support for other record types can be done later.
 9. Currently, the `.bit` eTLD is not considered a secure origin like
 `.onion`.  So visiting a `.bit` domain will not be recognized by Firefox
 as secure, nor will it show the onion icon.  Visiting a `.bit.onion`
 domain will work fine though.  I will fix this later.
 10. The circuit display panel will show the `.onion` domain that a
 Namecoin domain points to.  Kudos to Arthur for that patch.
 11. This patch includes an implementation of Prop279.  My implementation
 differs from the spec by adding a "stream isolation ID" field to the
 `RESOLVE` command.  If desired, I could submit a spec patch for Prop279
 that makes it match this implementation.  Let me know if you'd like me to
 do that.
 12. I've probably forgotten some potentially relevant notes; if anything
 doesn't make sense or you otherwise have some questions for me, please
 don't hesitate to ask.
 13. As far as I can tell, this patch is ready for review.

 Cheers!

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30558#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online