[tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu May 23 14:54:36 UTC 2019


#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,      |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec       |
Parent ID:  #14389                               |         Points:  6
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor27-must
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:13 dgoulet]:
 > Hmmm `SocksPort` flag could be an option. The other way is to create a
 new authentication method like prop229 does and thus the new error code
 are only returned if TB authenticated with this method. Former is simple,
 later is more involving but probably more portable for future compat?

 I don't know what the right answer is, but on the browser side we could
 accommodate either solution. A new SOCKS5 auth method would be more work
 for us, but should be do-able. But maybe other SOCKS5 clients won't care
 if they receive new error codes? I don't know.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30382#comment:14>
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