[tor-bugs] #29494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize interaction between circuitmux and circuitpadding

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#29494: Optimize interaction between circuitmux and circuitpadding
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry                            |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, network-team-               |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 042-proposed                 |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  5
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor2
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 => wtf-pad, network-
     team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 042-proposed
 * parent:  #28634 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 The machines in #28634 have been updated so that they are not sensitive to
 timing on the relay side -- they just need to send padding cells back-to-
 back, which will happen just fine with the existing callback placement.
 This can switch to 0.4.2 now.

 Additionally, I want to expose the different optimization strategy options
 to the padding machines, as certain types of machines would actually be
 able to send **much** less padding if they were given options like "only
 send padding when the circuitmux queue is empty" (since many machines will
 really only care about making bursts longer and inserting any padding
 before that will just add latency and waste bandwidth). Other machines may
 want different strategies with similar things from my earlier comments on
 this ticket.

 So let's keep mulling this over for a bit more and see what researchers
 need.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29494#comment:9>
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