[tor-bugs] #21304 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Sanitize snowflake.log

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Mar 22 00:34:06 UTC 2019


#21304: Sanitize snowflake.log
-----------------------------------+--------------------------------
 Reporter:  arlolra                |          Owner:  cohosh
     Type:  defect                 |         Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                 |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter                |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                         |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                         |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:11 cohosh]:
 > What are our feelings about scrubbing fingerprints from logs as well? Is
 it necessary? The one in particular I'm looking at is the received answer
 in the client log:
 > {{{
 > a=ice-options:trickle
 > a=fingerprint:sha-256
 8D:CE:FE:08:F1:AC:32:30:88:D1:B4:1A:34:84:19:C2:43:18:4A:57:A9:20:2F:DC:C2:32:01:38:F9:8B:E5:8C
 > a=setup:active
 > a=mid:data
 > }}}
 >
 > If we don't need the fingerprint, I'd prefer to "over scrub" instead of
 potentially leaking info if the IPv6 logging violates the above
 assumption.

 (Sidestepping the question slightly.) In the case of these full SDP
 stanzas, I think we should just not be logging them at all, not by default
 anyway.

 The historical reason why the client logs these, I believe, has to do with
 early development of the system, when we would do ICE signaling manually
 (i.e., copy-and-paste the information from the terminal and into the
 browser, and vice versa). That's what the "SEND" button at
 https://snowflake.torproject.org/snowflake.html, and the
 `NewCopyPasteDialer` in client, are for. I'm okay with that mode of
 operation going away.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21304#comment:13>
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