[tor-bugs] #31075 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jul 3 14:49:53 UTC 2019


#31075: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
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     Reporter:  acat                      |      Owner:  tbb-team
         Type:  defect                    |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium                    |  Milestone:
    Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal                    |   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:                            |  Parent ID:
       Points:                            |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                            |
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 I think the patch for #26353 is not strictly needed, since the speculative
 connections are blocked when a proxy is configured (here:
 https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-
 dev/blob/esr60/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp#L1621, and same in 68). So
 while the speculative requests can be seen in torbutton domain-isolator,
 they should be dropped before they reach tor client.

 I tested by changing the torbutton code to not put all these to the
 `--unknown--` catch-all circuit so that they could be tracked, and while I
 can see these in logs coming from the domain isolator, there are no
 corresponding open circuits in the `Torbutton INFO: controlPort << getinfo
 circuit-status` logs.


 It's always possible that this might change in the future (according to
 the comments in that file, the reason why the speculative connections are
 not performed when there is a proxy do not seem so strong). So we might
 still want the current patch for #26353 just in case, I'm not sure.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31075>
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