[tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

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#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  korobkov                             |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4                  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change,  |  Actual Points:  1.25
  anti-censorship-roadmap                        |
Parent ID:  #30471                               |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw                                  |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor28-must
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Comment (by ahf):

 Replying to [comment:32 teor]:
 > But since the user can only set one value for each environmental
 variable, we should treat an unqualified address as applying to every
 transport that isn't named.
 >
 > So we would end up with something like:
 >
 >
 TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V4=obfs4-0.0.0.0,snowflake-203.0.113.4,203.0.113.2
 >
 > I'm not sure if we need this level of complexity in our implementation?
 > We could put transport-qualified addresses in the spec, but avoid
 implementing them until we actually have some demand for them.

 I also don't see much sense in implementing this additional complexity and
 this was considered when the spec change was proposed.

 For Tor clients I cannot think of any use case where you want to have
 multiple different source addresses for different transports since most
 people will have up to two different IP's, at max, per family
 (wifi/ethernet, whonix internal/external IP in Qubes, internal/external
 interface on a router).

 For Tor bridges: I think everybody who wants to run multiple transports
 would be much better off running multiple instances of Tor itself with a
 single transport enabled given that they then get access to statistics and
 other useful information on how their bridge is doing. Or what am I
 missing here?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5304#comment:33>
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