[tor-bugs] #29427 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist: Poor performance with a small amount of sockets

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Feb 12 20:53:51 UTC 2019


#29427: kist: Poor performance with a small amount of sockets
-----------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  dgoulet          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect           |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium           |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor     |        Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched, kist  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                   |         Points:
 Reviewer:                   |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by pastly):

 The following graph I have more confidence in as a useful piece of
 evidence for you.

 This is a tiny 10 relay network run on localhost on my desktop Debian 9
 computer. There is one Tor client with one curl downloading a single large
 file of all zeros from nginx also running on localhost. The client builds
 normal three hop circuits to this webserver, always choosing the target
 relay as the first hop. All relays and the client have the same scheduler,
 and in the case of KIST, the same run interval too. Everyone is running
 Debian's Tor 0.3.5.7 unmodified.

 Here is the configuration of a relay in the network:

 {{{
 $ cat torrc-common

 ShutdownWaitLength 2
 ExitRelay 1
 IPv6Exit 1
 ExitPolicy accept *:*
 CookieAuthentication 1
 ContactInfo pastly at torproject.org
 LogTimeGranularity 1
 SafeLogging 0

 DirAuthority auth1 orport=10102 no-v2
 v3ident=13572CEF296468E344506CAE402BDE55A28C21CD 127.100.1.1:10103
 04C4B152E7EE3960B947BDE96823728132BE2A06
 DirAuthority auth2 orport=10106 no-v2
 v3ident=47188F93370723370B6C1F441C9131F68F65F54C 127.100.1.1:10107
 A182371ABFBDE825B359AD005EEA795F27F91C81
 DirAuthority auth3 orport=10110 no-v2
 v3ident=CA8134FE7E018D48C4821E3C3233DE5A6C68C823 127.100.1.1:10111
 71A9A9E880118B4BCA5B5A4303BF8C0534F92D2F
 TestingTorNetwork 1
 # change between kist and vanilla here
 # change KISTSchedRunInterval with consensus
 #     param and waiting for it to be disseminated
 #     to all
 Schedulers Vanilla

 $ cat relay1/torrc

 %include torrc-common
 DataDirectory relay1
 PidFile relay1/tor.pid
 #Log notice file relay1/notice.log
 Address 127.100.1.1
 SocksPort 127.100.1.1:10112
 ControlPort 127.100.1.1:10113
 ControlSocket /redacted/path/to/relay1/control_socket
 ORPort 127.100.1.1:10114
 DirPort 127.100.1.1:10115
 Nickname relay1
 CacheDirectory /tmp/relay1


 }}}

 Here is the configuration of the client in this network:

 {{{
 $ cat torrc-common

 DirAuthority auth1 orport=10102 no-v2
 v3ident=13572CEF296468E344506CAE402BDE55A28C21CD 127.100.1.1:10103
 04C4B152E7EE3960B947BDE96823728132BE2A06
 DirAuthority auth2 orport=10106 no-v2
 v3ident=47188F93370723370B6C1F441C9131F68F65F54C 127.100.1.1:10107
 A182371ABFBDE825B359AD005EEA795F27F91C81
 DirAuthority auth3 orport=10110 no-v2
 v3ident=CA8134FE7E018D48C4821E3C3233DE5A6C68C823 127.100.1.1:10111
 71A9A9E880118B4BCA5B5A4303BF8C0534F92D2F

 TestingTorNetwork 1
 NumCPUs 1
 LogTimeGranularity 1
 SafeLogging 0
 ShutdownWaitLength 2
 CookieAuthentication 1
 # change between kist and vanilla here
 # change KISTSchedRunInterval with consensus
 #     param and waiting for it to be disseminated
 #     to all
 Schedulers Vanilla

 $ cat client10301/torrc

 %include torrc-common
 DataDirectory client10301
 PidFile client10301/tor.pid
 #Log notice file client10301/notice.log
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:10301
 ControlSocket /redacted/path/to/client10301/control_socket
 CacheDirectory /tmp/client10301
 EntryNodes relay1
 }}}

 Please use the following graph for insight instead of the previously
 shared perf-10ms.png. The following graph is way closer to the real world
 (unmodified Tor binary, 3 hop circuits, etc.)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29427#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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