[tor-bugs] #29448 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Provide a dir-spec implementation that serves sanitised descriptors

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#29448: Provide a dir-spec implementation that serves sanitised descriptors
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 Reporter:  irl                   |          Owner:  sysrqb
     Type:  project               |         Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low                   |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                        |         Points:
 Reviewer:                        |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:2 irl]:
 > Is it currently possible for someone to operate their own CollecTor
 instance and archive bridge descriptors? The answer is no unless they are
 syncing from our CollecTor instance.

 That's true, but it's also an okay answer. If we wanted to fix just this,
 we could run a separate CollecTor instance with just the bridge descriptor
 sanitize on a separate host and have everyone (including us) sync from
 that. (I'm not suggesting we do that.)

 > We have access to bridge IPs, which is sensitive information, regardless
 of whether or not we publish that information. This is a violation of not
 handling sensitive information.

 While I'd prefer not to handle sensitive information, I don't consider
 this a violation of a principle. Of course, if the BridgeDB folks would
 run this sanitizing code, that would mean that fewer people have access to
 sensitive information. While this is preferable, I wouldn't say that the
 current setup is bad per se.

 > > So, the goal here is basically to extract the sanitizing code from
 CollecTor and put it on the BridgeDB host, probably rewritten in a
 different language. Right?
 >
 > Yes.
 >
 > > However, I can also see the downsides: code complexity of BridgeDB
 will suddenly increase, and whoever runs BridgeDB has one more complex
 thing to take care of.
 >
 > We do get the benefit that we no longer have to handle bridge IPs and
 things are more reproducible. It is also easier for people to run testing
 BridgeDBs with a testing CollecTor instance. It is also easier for people
 to run their own production BridgeDBs that we can see statistics of (which
 is a goal that has been previously discussed, to reduce reliance on the
 single BridgeDB instance and allow orgs to set up their own).

 Agreed on these.

 However, in the course of adding more pros and cons, I'd like to add
 another aspect: years ago we had to give up on collecting bridge pool
 assignments because the BridgeDB folks back then didn't care enough. It
 would be sad to lose sanitized bridge descriptors because BridgeDB
 suddenly gets less attention than it should. Syncing unsanitized
 descriptors seems like a minimal thing that BridgeDB folks can keep up
 over a long time. If they need to do more, maybe they'll at some point
 stop doing it at all.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29448#comment:3>
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