[tor-bugs] #32861 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Fingerprint.js PRO" successfully fingerprints Tor Browser

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Dec 31 06:01:16 UTC 2019


#32861: "Fingerprint.js PRO" successfully fingerprints Tor Browser
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 Reporter:  printerman22              |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [ticket:32861 printerman22]:
 > A potential solution is taking some features from the "Trace" Firefox
 add-on

 OOoh... almost forgot... **please don't use non-TB provided extensions**:
 they will increase your entropy and they are not vetted by the TB team (I
 know for a fact that double trace has a number of flaws: no, I won't
 elaborate)

 This works because it is trivial to alter the id hash, and the extension
 is **randomizing** some results: cogito ergo sum: different hash. TB could
 also easily do this by simply randomizing something, like canvas: but this
 is not TB's design/spec (although personally, I think some areas could do
 with it when implemented)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32861#comment:2>
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