[tor-bugs] #31512 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser

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#31512: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
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 Reporter:  thelamper                            |          Owner:  tbb-
                                                 |  team
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major                                |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  fingerprinting, fingerprint, user-   |  Actual Points:
  agent switcher                                 |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 The user-agent string is the same for all Tor Browser users, so it is not
 a fingerprinting vector, and installing a user-agent switcher will not
 improve things here (and actually make things worse when you are the only
 one doing it).

 Regarding randomization of the user-agent, you can read the section
 "Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" in the Tor
 Browser design documentation:
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31512#comment:1>
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