[tor-bugs] #30288 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Tor Relay Guide

Thu Apr 25 16:21:57 UTC 2019

#30288: Tor Relay Guide
---------------------+-----------------------------------
 Reporter:  siggi    |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  project  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |      Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks
  Version:           |       Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:           |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:           |         Points:
 Reviewer:           |        Sponsor:
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 It seems not to be not possible, to find and change some of configurations
 lines:

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu

 #change the nickname "myNiceRelay" to a name that you like
 Nickname myNiceRelay
 ORPort 443
 ExitRelay 0
 SocksPort 0
 ControlSocket 0
 # Change the email address bellow and be aware that it will be published
 ContactInfo tor-operator at your-emailaddress-domain

 I changed my file like this:

 ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
 ## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
 ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
 ##
 ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
 ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
 ## by removing the "#" symbol.
 ##
 ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
 ## for more options you can use in this file.
 ##
 ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
 ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc

 ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
 ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
 ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
 #SocksPort 0 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
 #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.

 ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
 ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
 ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
 ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
 ## you make.
 #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
 #SocksPolicy reject *

 ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
 ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
 ## you want.
 ##
 ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
 ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
 ##
 ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to
 /var/log/tor/notices.log
 #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
 ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
 #Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
 ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
 #Log notice syslog
 ## To send all messages to stderr:
 #Log debug stderr

 ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
 ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
 ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
 #RunAsDaemon 1

 ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
 ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
 #DataDirectory /var/lib/tor

 ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
 ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
 #ControlPort 0
 ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
 ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
 #HashedControlPassword
 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
 #CookieAuthentication 1

 ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###

 ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
 ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
 ## to tell people.
 ##
 ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
 ## address y:z.

 #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
 #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

 #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
 #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
 #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22

 ################ This section is just for relays #####################
 #
 ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.

 ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
 #ORPort 443
 ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
 ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
 ## follows.  You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
 ## yourself to make this work.
 #ORPort 443 NoListen
 #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise

 ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
 ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
 #Address noname.example.com

 ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
 ## outgoing traffic to use.
 # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5

 ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
 #Nickname holyghostwork

 ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
 ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
 ## be at least 20 KB.
 ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
 ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20,
 etc.
 #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB  # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
 #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)

 ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
 ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
 ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
 ## hibernating.
 ##
 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
 #AccountingMax 4 GB
 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
 #AccountingStart day 00:00
 ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
 ## is per month)
 #AccountingStart month 3 15:00

 ## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
 ## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
 ## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
 ## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
 ## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
 ## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
 #ContactInfo Random Person <coeche AT yandex dot com>
 ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
 #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>

 ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
 ## if you have enough bandwidth.
 #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
 ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
 ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
 ## follows.  below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
 ## forwarding yourself to make this work.
 #DirPort 80 NoListen
 #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
 ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
 ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
 ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
 ## distribution for a sample.
 #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html

 ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
 ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
 ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
 ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
 ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
 ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it
 would
 ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
 #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...

 ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
 ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
 ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
 ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
 ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
 ## described in the man page or at
 ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
 ##
 ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
 ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
 ##
 ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
 ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
 ## users will be told that those destinations are down.
 ##
 ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
 ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
 ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
 ##
 #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
 #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
 #ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed

 ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
 ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
 ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
 ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
 ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
 ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
 #BridgeRelay 1
 ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
 ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
 ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
 ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
 #PublishServerDescriptor 0

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30288>
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