[tor-bugs] #21503 [Core Tor/Tor]: ship default MapAddress for at least torproject.org hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21503: ship default MapAddress for at least torproject.org hosts
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 Reporter:  acceleraTor                          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Low                                  |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Minor                                |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client mapaddress onion-mapping  |  Actual Points:
  onion-naming maybe-bad-idea                    |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > This might be a tor browser packaging ticket instead.
 Sorry, you are talking about "Onion everywhere" #21952. But but shouldn't
 an self called OnionRouter route to Onions Anywhere ? The torrc Option
 will allow ALL traffic to go to onion hs not only browser users. This will
 work fine and transparently for example for debian repos.
 DNS (DoH) as Implement into new firefox. Mail Clients. Coin Nodes.
 Instantmessage/Chat apps. and so on.
 Can't we push this via maybe consensus for at least the known own
 addresses *.torproject.org mappings?


 Distinguishing the Circuits
 Remember that while one exit node can serve many many different clients,
 from Website point of view all of that traffic comes from one IP address.
 This pooling helps cover the malicious traffic among legitimate traffic,
 but isn’t essential in the security or privacy of Tor. In fact, it can
 potentially hurt users by exposing their traffic to bad exit nodes!

 Another reason is the bandwidth costs of exit node operators. This is an
 area that we hope this service can offer relief since it shifts traffic
 from exit nodes to our own servers, reducing exit node operation costs
 along with it.

 Additionally, since like Tor Browser 8.0 makes a new circuit for each
 hostname when connecting via an .onion alternative service, the circuit
 number cannot be used to link connections to two different sites together
 in onion space.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21503#comment:4>
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