[tor-bugs] #17945 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop single hop client connections to Single Onion Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17945: Stop single hop client connections to Single Onion Services
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web, tor-hs, 029-proposed, 029   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  -teor-no, needs-design, needs-proposal-maybe,  |
  single-onion, review-group-33,                 |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328      |
Parent ID:  #24962                               |         Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn, teor                            |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ok,

 >Stop clients sending arbitrary Rendezvous points to Single Onion
 Services:
 What if a Tor2web Client connects with
 {{{
 Tor2webRendezvousPoints MyOwnNode
 }}}
 set. Where MyOwnNode runnning on the same network/machine as client, is it
 a ''ZER''0-hop "direct" connection? It's no issue for IP Leak as Single
 Onion Services opts out from anonymity anyway.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:63>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online