[tor-bugs] #9316 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should export statistics

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Apr 6 00:30:24 UTC 2019


#9316: BridgeDB should export statistics
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  task                                 |         Status:
                                                 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB                 |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, network-team-     |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2                              |
Parent ID:  #19332                               |         Points:  3
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor19
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by phw):

 Here's a preliminary list of statistics that we may want, and why we want
 them. Needless to say, we need to figure out how to collect these
 statistics safely.

 * Approximate number of ''successful'' requests per distribution
 mechanism, per country, per bridge type.
   * This shows us the demand for bridges over time, and how much use
 BridgeDB sees.
   * It also teaches us what distribution mechanisms are the most useful
 (or at least popular).

 * Approximate number of ''denied'' requests per distribution mechanism,
 per country, per bridge type.
   * This may show us if people are interacting with BridgeDB
 unsuccessfully, despite good intentions.
   * It may also show us if somebody is trying to game the system.
   * Unfortunately, it's difficult to tell apart well-intentioned misuse
 from ill-intentioned misuse.

 * Approximate number of ''email'' requests per provider, per bridge type.
   * This would help us decide what email providers we should pay attention
 to.
   * This would also teach us what providers we could safely retire. For
 example, over at #28496, we are thinking about removing Yahoo. What
 fraction of requests would be affected by this?

 * Approximate number of ''HTTPS'' requests coming from proxies.
   * This may be an indicator of people trying to game the system.

 * Maybe the number of bridges per transport in BridgeDB (see #14453).

 What am I forgetting?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9316#comment:16>
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