[tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Sep 18 12:42:43 UTC 2018


#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  sysrqb                               |          Owner:  neel
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap-     |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs                            |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet                              |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hi! Thanks for this patch!

 I have a request and a question and a concern:

 The request: Could somebody replace the "bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha" in the
 changelog with the actual version that first contained this bug?  (If a
 bug first appears in A, and we fix it in B, the changelog should say
 "bugfix on A".)

 The question: Does this apply to v3 onion services too?  Should it?

 The concern: I don't know if checking the "mixed" flags for equality is
 what we actually want here. (The flag "ISO_XYZ" is set in
 `isolation_flags_mixed` when the circuit have been used to connect streams
 with two different values for the "XYZ" parameter.  Why are we looking at
 that?)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26368#comment:15>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list