[tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Nov 7 19:47:02 UTC 2018


#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  starlight     |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement   |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium        |      Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9  |       Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:                |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------
 A relay I operate recently experienced a DOS state resulting from intense
 scanning behavior.  The scanner initiated huge quantities of connections
 outbound on an exit such that the interface maximum configured socket
 count (62k) was fully consumed and normal client activity was squashed to
 zero.  Load was so intense it was difficult to SSH in, NTP complained it
 could not reach time servers and numerous attempts were required to
 successfully open a daemon control socket (via loopback, not sure why).
 Was able to mitigate the attack without restarting any daemons and nothing
 broke, node resumed normal operation.  Clearly a recoverable resource
 exhaustion scenario.

 To limit the impact of this category of activity, two relatively simple
 mitigations come to mind:

 1) create a configurable limit on the number of OR + DIR + exit_edge
 connections on each interface which may be set lower than absolute
 resource limits; this will prevent a DOS situation from rendering the
 overall system inaccessible and hopefully permit unimpaired daemon control
 ports creation; the setting will interact with the maximum number of in-
 flight DNS queries when a local resolver is configured and this ought to
 be documented

 2) create a outbound exit_edge connection rate limit set to some
 reasonable value to constrain scanning

 NOTES:

 file handle limit 128k

 nf_conntrack_max = 65536

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28367>
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