[tor-bugs] #28275 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Rotate intro points and close RP circuits when removing client auth service side

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#28275: hs-v3: Rotate intro points and close RP circuits when removing client auth
service side
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 Reporter:  dgoulet           |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect            |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High         |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor      |        Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:
 Reviewer:                    |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by haxxpop):

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > one is whether the client can decrypt the descriptor (to learn the intro
 points), and the other is whether the client can prove that it's
 authorized in the INTRODUCE1 cell? I'm tempted to try to solve this one by
 defining "revoke" to focus on that second component. I also wish we had
 actual use cases for this client auth design, so we wouldn't be left
 trying to debate over what future hypothetical users would want the system
 to do.


 We previously had a discussion about that second component in the
 INTRODUCE1 cell. By that time, we decided to not implement it (and
 probably will never) because the only benefit of INTRODUCE1 authorization
 is to let the service know which client it is connected to and then the
 service can serve different services for different clients.

 But that can be implemented easily in the application layer and the
 feature is not related to anonymity (not related to Tor). So we thought we
 don't need to implement it at all.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28275#comment:5>
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