[tor-bugs] #25552 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Onion service rev counters are useless and actually harmful for scalability

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu May 3 10:51:24 UTC 2018


#25552: prop224: Onion service rev counters are useless and actually harmful for
scalability
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                             |         Status:
                                               |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                             |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                               |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                       |        Version:  Tor:
                                               |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal                             |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 034-roadmap-master  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                     |         Points:  4
 Reviewer:  asn                                |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Looks better!

 I did another review and pushed some changes to `ticket25552_034_02`.
 Changes are in different commits, so if you don't like some of them feel
 free to not cherry-pick them! I also added a comment on github.

 Do you think we can run this on your relay for a few days (perhaps with
 increased logging) to ensure that we get no replay situations? I'm mainly
 afraid of the case where the HS cache clears its descriptor cache, and the
 HS tries to send us the same descriptor, and we reject it even tho we dont
 have one. I looked at the code and I believe that this cant happen since
 each HS descriptor is different (because of encryption salt, etc.), but
 still want to make sure :)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25552#comment:22>
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