[tor-bugs] #20212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

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#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources
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 Reporter:  gacar                                |          Owner:  tbb-
                                                 |  team
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery,                     |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803                           |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > After some more discussion happened, let's try to fix that on the
 browser side (first). mcs/brade: can you look into it?

 Yes, we can take a look. It would be helpful to develop a better
 understanding of what kind of attack(s) we are trying to prevent. That
 might lead to a better design. For example, do we want to limit the rate
 at which new circuits can be opened or do we just want to refuse to open
 more than N circuits per site? Unfortunately, Kathy and I don't really
 know enough about `tor` and the Tor Network to do that kind of analysis,
 so hints about what should be done would be greatly appreciated.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20212#comment:12>
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