[tor-bugs] #26905 [Core Tor/Tor]: Work out if we need to round observed relay bandwidths to protect individual client usage

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Jul 23 01:49:53 UTC 2018


#26905: Work out if we need to round observed relay bandwidths to protect
individual client usage
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  teor     |      Owner:  (none)
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
    Component:  Core     |    Version:
  Tor/Tor                |   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,
     Severity:  Normal   |  035-roadmap-proposed
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:  #25925
       Points:           |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Relays maintain detailed information about their maximum network load.
 After #24104, relays only report their maximum bandwidth once a day, over
 10 seconds of measurement.

 How sensitive is this bandwidth information?

 Should we round these bandwidths to:
 * a number of decimal places?
 * a set amount of client usage that we want to protect?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26905>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list