[tor-bugs] #26778 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jul 19 14:46:42 UTC 2018


#26778: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities
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 Reporter:  chelseakomlo                         |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridges needs-testing? needs-    |  Actual Points:
  proposal?                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by gman999):

 >A bridge should be able to select a bridge authority from the list of
 authorities, where multiple >bridge authorities can be represented, and
 try one at a time until it is able to successfully upload >its descriptor.

 I thought the data was being *pushed* by the bridge authority, not pulled.

 Ultimately, if I'm reading this right, it's:

 * a single bridge authority, which lessens opportunity for bridge
 discovery, yet becomes a single point of failure.

 * multiple bridge authorities, with increases chance of bridge discovery,
 but decentralized and more resilient.

 Maybe reworking through the threat model on bridge discovery and past
 experiences could be worthwhile to make a more informed decision on this?

 Clearly FDE and physical security become a requirement, and not a flavor.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26778#comment:5>
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