[tor-bugs] #26620 [Community/Relays]: Tor Relay Guide: relays operators shouldn't expose their fine-grained monitoring graphs public

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#26620: Tor Relay Guide: relays operators shouldn't expose their fine-grained
monitoring graphs public
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 Reporter:  ggus              |          Owner:  Nusenu
     Type:  enhancement       |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium            |      Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:
 Reviewer:                    |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > please provide examples or be more detailed in your description (e.g. do
 you mean real time monitoring data or screenshots of them)

 Real-time monitoring data, real-time graphs, and screenshots of detailed
 historical data are all bad for user privacy.

 In more detail:
 * Currently, public bandwidth reporting over any period less than 24 hours
 provides less security than tor bandwidth statistics.
 * Reporting individual relays is worse than reporting totals for groups of
 relays. In future, we will securely aggregate Tor's bandwidth statistics,
 so any individual relay bandwidth reporting will be less secure than Tor's
 statistics.
 * Smaller periods are worse.
 * Numbers are worse than graphs.
 * Real-time data is worse than historical data.
 * Data in categories (IP version, in/out, etc.) is worse than total data.

 If they want to report bandwidth, operators should aggregate all their
 relays' bandwidths over at least a week, then round to the nearest 10
 terabytes.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26620#comment:2>
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