[tor-bugs] #24902 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Jan 30 03:38:29 UTC 2018


#24902: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  dgoulet                              |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High                            |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  ddos, tor-relay, review-group-30,    |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 031-backport, 032-backport,      |
  review-group-31                                |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:  arma                                 |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:48 dgoulet]:
 > > But it looks like the call to dos_should_refuse_single_hop_client()
 doesn't care whether public_server_mode().
 >
 > Agree. Fixup commit: `ab7b9581f3`

 (A) I think this one is missing a !.

 (B) Yes, an 0.3.3 branch would be good so we have something to actually
 merge.

 (C), it wants a changes file. Here's a start:
 {{{
   o Major features:
     - Give relays some defenses against the recent network overload. We
       start with three defenses (default parameters in parentheses).
       First: if a single client address makes too many connections
       (>100), hang up on further connections. Second: if a single client
       address makes circuits too quickly (more than 3 per second, with
       an allowed burst of 90) while also having too many connections open
       (3), refuse new create cells for the next while (1-2 hours). Third:
       if a client asks to establish a rendezvous point to you directly,
       ignore the request. These defenses can be manually controlled
       by new torrc options, but relays will also take guidance from
       consensus parameters, so there's no need to configure anything
       manually. Implements ticket 24902.
 }}}

 Looking good!

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24902#comment:52>
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