[tor-bugs] #23101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Predict and build specific HS purpose circuits (rather than GENERAL)

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#23101: Predict and build specific HS purpose circuits (rather than GENERAL)
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 Reporter:  mikeperry                            |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery-  |  Actual Points:
  prop247-controller, review-group-27, review-   |
  group-30                                       |
Parent ID:  #13837                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:  asn                                  |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:27 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:26 teor]:
 > > ...
 > > But maybe it is better to always do vanguards for internal circuits.
 Do we know if the onion service attacks apply to other circuits?
 >
 > A good question. Is there some revised vanguard design proposal at this
 point? :) It would seem that at least service-side publishing doesn't
 happen that often, and more importantly doesn't happen in response to
 adversary action, so it wouldn't benefit as much from the vanguard
 approach.

 Let's not assume this.

 If an adversary can cause an onion service to repeatedly crash or run out
 of RAM, then service uploads happen in response to that adversary action.

 Also, in a non-traditional application like OnionFlare, an adversary could
 deliberately register sites that use adversarial HSDirs.

 Or if Ricochet ever used client authentication, a new friend request could
 result in a new client key and a descriptor upload.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23101#comment:28>
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